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On September 4, 1970 Salvador Allende became the first ever democratically elected Marxist president of Chile.

In addition he headed a

predominantly left-wing coalition government whose program entailed the
achieving of socialism by peaceful means.
During the first six months of his administration Allende began
to carry out a number of his policies in the areas of agrarian reform,
nationalization of industries, and redistribut..ion of income.

These poli-

cies were populist in nature and succeeded in raising the level of support
for the Unidad Popular government as shown by the results of the April
1971 Municipal elections.

I argue that the results of the Municipal

elections were a "strong mandate" for Allende to progress from populism
to a faster and more radical implementation of socialist policies.

The

reality of the situation, however, was one in which Allende became
increasingly reformist and willing to compromise with the opposition.

I

try to describe and analyze the steadily increasing polarization process
which was taking place in Chilean society.

The Right, with help from the

United States, was slowly beginning to organize itself against Allende by
the use of constitutional and violent means.

I argue that the United

States in particular was instrumental in causing economic disruption and
fueling dissatisfaction with the Unidad Popular.
The Right's offensive against the government reached high points
in the "Bosses Strike" of October 1972 and the abortive coup d'etat
attempted by a section of the armed forces in June 1973.

In response to

these events, the workers mobilized themselves to defend their conununities
and factories.

However, Allende failed to provide the workers' mobiliza-

tions with leader~hip.

Instead, he became increasingly reformist and com-

promising with his opponents.
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During the last year of the Allende administration the polarization process continued to intensify, and it became clear that the Right
was commited to the overthrow of the U.P. government.

Even so, Allende

came to rely increasingly on the armed forces for support, a policy which
proved to be extremely naive as he was overthrown by this aforementioned
group in September 1973.
Throughout the paper I attempt to ana].yze the roles played by the
respective political actors as the polarization process unfo1ded, intensified, and culminated in the coup d'etat.

Those who come in for special

attention include the United States and the M.I.R. (Movement of the
Revolutionary Left).
In addition I make a brief study of the left-wing parties in
France and Italy at the present time (re:

September 1977), and make some

tentative comparisons with Chile under Allende, and some predictions for
the future.
My main sources of data are books, articles, and newspapers, though
I also make use of United States government documents.

This thesis is not

an empirical study, but is based on closely reasoned arguments which are
used to support a particular analytical viewpoint.

These arguments are

presented in the form of six hypotheses or propositions.
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INTRODUCTION

On September 4, 1973 the government of President Salvador
Allende of Chile was overthrown in a coup d'etat carried out by the
armed forces.

There were a number of forces and factors at work during

the three years of Allende's administration which contributed to the
overthrow.

In this paper I will try to observe, describe, and most

importantly, analyze those which I feel were the most significant.
Unidad Popular and the revolutionary left.
Right and the United States.

The

The Christian Democrats, the

I intend to investigate and evaluate the

role that each of these actors played.
An analysis of the political situation in Chile between 1970 and
1973 is my main objective, however, it is going to be an analysis conducted from the standpoint of being heavily critical of the Unidad Popular
and President Salvador Allende.

Critical in terms of the government being

too moderate, too slow to carry out policies and far too willing to compromise with the opposition.

Throughout the paper I implicitly and expli-

citly argue that the Left, in general, and Allende, in particular, should
adopt a faster and more .revolutionary-orientated strategy for gaining complete state power.
In the final chapter I attempt to make some tentative comparisons
and predictions concerning the present situations in Italy and France
(October 1977), as they relate to Chile during Allende's administration.
For the purposes of studying the issues which I have mentioned
above I formulated a set of six hypotheses or propositions.

1

These two
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terms will be used synonomously and the use of the former is not meant
to imply that these positions are based on a rigorous empirical study.
1) The period irrunediately after the April 1971
Municipal elections was an opportune time for
Allende to press forward quickly with the Unidad Popular (U.P.) program.
The fact that he
failed to do so not only showed that his policies
were basically reformist, but also that his analysis of the deepening class struggle was incorrect.
2) As the polarization process i~tensified Allende became
increasingly reformist and more compromising towards
the opposition, causing him to miss another opportunity to move towards the building of a socialist
society.
3) Allende misunderstood the intensifying nature of the
class struggle, and as a result of this, became
increasingly reliant on the armed forces and hence
helped bring about his own downfall and that of the
working class.
4) The U.S. was directly and indirectly involved in the
build-up to the coup in Chile and although it was not
solely responsible for the overthrow, its role must
in no way be underestimated.
5) Although the M.I.R. 's activities caused the U.P. to
move to the left on certain occasions, it cannot be
held responsible for provoking the Rightist offensive.
6) The "via Chilena" has important implications for
European leftists' attempts to come to power, although
any comparisons and speculations can only be of ·the
most tentative nature at the present time.
The ideas for these propositions came out of the almost unique and
intriguing aspects connected with the "Chilean experience" of 1970-73.
Chile can be classified as a developing nation, however, its history and
character seemed not unlike those of Western democracies.

Into this system

came the first democratically elected Marxist president, heading a leftwing coalition and seemingly dedicated to transforming Chile into a socialist society by peaceful means.

Almost the whole of the world's eyes
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focused on this tiny country to see if such a unique experiment could
succeed.

Not only was it of interest to revolutionaries, but the effect

of its success or failure would be important, domestically, to left-wing
parties throughout Latin America and Europe.
This interest was reflected in the many books and articles written
about the situation in Chile.

From my viewpoint one of the most important

of these is Revolution and Counter-Revolution~ eds., Paul M. Sweezy and
Harry Magdoff (New York:

Monthly review Press, 1974).

This book contains articles that had previously been published in
the independent socialist magazine, "Monthly Review."

Most of the articles

were written before the coup and hence were not written with the benefit
of hindsight.

However, this has not detracted from the book's analytical

qualities or from its usefulness as a historical record.
One of the main themes throughout the book is the question of power;
an absolutely fundamental and extremely important question in any revolutionary situation.

The Popular Unity (U.P.) government controlled only

the executive, and the other branches of government, the legislative, judiciary and armed forces were in the hands of the opposition.

These could

be used as bases from which to counter-attack the U.P. and overthrow it.
As Zimblast and Stallings point out in a la,er chapter, Allende never
really worked out a rigorous plan by which to take complete state control.
The book unfolds in a historical manner and Allende and the U.P. are criticized for their misconceptions concerning the peaceful road to socialism.
The editors consistently maintain that at some point in the revolutionary
process, violent confrontation is inevitable.
realize or prepare for it.

However, Allende failed to

4
Disaster in Chile, ed., Les Evans (New York:

Pathfinder Press, 1974).

This source compliments Sweezy and Magdoff's collection and is an
extremely useful book in itself as it consists of a collection of articles
taken mainly from the international Trotskyist news magazine, Intercontinental Press.

As with Revolution and Counter-revolution, most of the

articles in this book were written at the time the particular events took
place.

Given that as the case, the Trotskyist predictions throughout the

•

book are remarkably accurate.

The articles stress the reformist nature

of the U.P., and in particular the CP, and how by their policies, they are
betraying their own followers--the workers.

Other themes revolve around

the inevitability of violent confrontation, and the need for a popular
militia and a mass revolutionary party.

The writers in this book are

heavily critical of Allende, more so than Sweezy and Magdoff, for not
reacting decisively to the dynamics of the class struggle.
This book makes no pretense of offering a balanced argument, but
is in fact an analysis of the situation from a mainly Trotskyist viewpoint.
However, this should no way detract from its literary importance in this
field.
No review of literature in this field would be complete without
this next book as it constitutes a valuable source of background information on Salvador Allende.

Chilean Revolution: Conversations w:i,_th Allende, Regis Debray (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1971).
The main part of this book consists of a dialogue between Regis
Debray and Salvador Allende, which took place in January 1971.

Conse-

quently, then, this book is different from the preceding two, as it does
not offer a historical record or an analysis of the Chilean experience.
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However, it is an important book in that it enables one to gain an
insight into the background, thoughts and ideas of the founder of the
Socialist Party and recently confirmed President of Chile.

Debray asks

Allende the questions any revolutionary would pose, and which eve~ts were
later to answer.

Can the peaceful road to socialism succeed?

confrontation inevitable, and if so, how will you face it?

Is violent

Allende's

responses are generally optimistic even in his.appraisal of the future
actions of the armed forces and the United States.
The reader comes away with an impression of a sincere, dedicated
man who believes that he can lead Chile to socialism, though obviously in
retrospect, some of his ideas and strategies seem heavily tinged with
naivety.
James Petras has written a number of interesting articles on Chile,
and he has also collaborated with Morris Morley to produce a book which
documents and analyzes the United States involvement in Chile.

United States and Chile:
Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende
Government, James Petras and Horris Morley (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1975).
This book is the answer to the apologists who have minimized the
United States' role in Chile.

Petras and Morley argue otherwise--that in

fact the U.S. was deeply involed in the overthrow of Allende.

For the most

part they support their arguments with congressional hearings, mass media
accounts, and interviews with U.S. officials.

However, on certain occa-

sions their rhetoric becomes too ambitious in that some of their claims
are not substantiated by reference to a primary source.

Nevertheless, on

the whole, this is a convincing book, as the authors put Chilean-U.S.
relations in their historical perspective and also relate to the larger
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Latin American context (especially Peru and Brazil).

The authors build

up a realistic picture of U.S. machinations against Chile and the effect
this had on causing economic and social disruption, political polarization
and eventually the coup d'etat.
This book, then, constitutes another piece of material to augment
the already existing literature on America's global imperialist activitie3.
U.S. imperialism is also dealt with in•the work done by the North
American Congress on Latin America (N.A.C.L.A.)

New Chile, N.A.C.L.A. (Berkeley, California:

Waller Press, 1972).

This book was prepared by the North American Congress on Latin
America (N.A.C.L.A.), a radical research group, and it acquaints the
reader with some of the most important issues surrounding the victory of
the U.P. :i_n the 1970 ele'tions.

The two main sections of the book are

entitled, "The First Year," and "Imperialism and the Old Order."

The

first section covers the first twelve months of the U.P. government, and
not only does it serve as a useful historical record of this period, but
it also makes clear its anti-imperialistic viewpoint.

This is especially

noticeable in the articles entitled "The Enemy Within--The Right Responds,"
and "The Carrot and the Stick--U.S. Aid."

This theme is continued in the

second section under titles such as "Brought to You by Uncle Sam, 11 and
"The Story of Copper and Imperialism."

This section is further supple-

mented by some extremely informative material concerning agrarian land
reform.

The N.A.C.L.A researchers also contributed some much needed infor-

mation on the M.I.R.

This book contains an article on their activities

during the early period of the U.P. government and their official response
to the U.P. victory in 1970.
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Much "grass roots" research has gone into this book and it provides a good perspective from which to view and undertake further research
on the U.P. government and Chilean politics as a whole.
Allende's Chile, ed., Phillip O'Brien (New York:

Praeger Publishers, 1976)

This is one of the more recent books to be written on the Allende
period in Chile, and the contributions in this book originally arose out
of a series of specialist seminars held at the Institute of Latin American
Studies, University of Glasgow.

Viewing the articles as a whole, the

final effect is to provide a very comprehensive coverage of Chilean politics and society.

The first chapter gives an overall analysis of the

Chilean class structure and class politics.
the book concentrates on four main areas.

From this background position

An analysis of the main policies

of the U.P. government; the response of the working classes; the tactics
and strategy of those opposed to the U.P. govenrrnent; and finally, a brief
account of what has been happening in Chile since the coup, and the main
lessons to be drawn from the Chilean experience.
Like Revolution and Counter Revolution, and Disaster·in Chile, this
collection of articles, on the whole, analyzes the situation from a particular viewpoint.

This tends to be one which is often critical of Allende

and his failure to move at a faster pace and more decisively towards socialism.

In contrast to the writers in the books mentioned above, O'Brien, at

times, tends to be more supportive of the U.P.'s overall objectives.
Most of the articles are detailed and well-documented, and all of
them were written with the benefit of hindsight.
and useful collection of articles.

An extermely interesting
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Although I have already given a brief introduction,_in order·vo
more clearly understand the political situation in Chile during the U.P.
government, a brief understanding of the historical background is also
necessary.·
As I am not attempting to give a thorough historical analysis of
Chilean politics, I will only go back as far as 1938, the year of the
Popular Front's election victory.

The Popular•Front was a very broad

alliance indeed and was composed of radicals, socialists, democrats
(members of the Democratic Party), and communists, who came together in
the wake of severe repressive measures meted out by President Alessandri.
Not only this but there was a substantial Nazi movement operating in Chile
at this time, and consequently, the Popular Front's specific aim was to
campaign to ensure the election of a candidate who believed in democracy.
The Popular Front ruled for the next fourteen years in a number
of different guises, with each government being more conservative than the
last.

From this the socialist Left of the 1970's learned an important

lesson, "not to accept as presidential candidate, someone from the least
revolutionary of the parties even though that person might have widespread
popular support."

1

Pedro Aguire Cerda, who was elected President on

October 25, 1938, typified this.

He was a member of the Radical Party;

the party which supplied 35 percent of the Popular Front's strength in
Cow.gress and held six of eleven cabinet posts.

Cerda and other bourgeois

elements in the Front were afraid of being too radical in their program
and hence nothing really .changed.

The masses, who's ideals and hopes had

voted the Front into power, were seriously disillusioned.

In addition,

the Left were not united at this time and consequently, no mass mobiliza-
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tions were organized to protest against the leadership.

Another lesson

that the socialist Left in the 1970's should have learned more keenly
from this was that, "the unity of the working class and other democratic
forces cannot be sustained only by the means of pacts and agreements made
at leadership levels, but that it is the continuous organization and
mobilization of the working class that really counts." 2
The masses, then, became very disillusioned with the Popular Front
and this feeling of disenchantment helped to usher in Carlos Ibanez (a
former dictator of Chile), as president in 1952.

He served as head of the

government until 1958, during which time he tied the Chilean economy more
and more closely to the United States.

However, depression, social insta-

bility and inflation worsened after World War II, and the IMF's plan of
austerity was not welcomed by the Chilean workers.

In 1954 and 1955 the

number of strikes continued to rise, and these elicited hard repressive
measures from Ibanez.

Going into the 1958 election campaign a large

section of the Chilean population were disenchanted with the prevailing
socio-economic conditions and Ibanez's repressive policies and capitalist
experiments.

The Left became united as the Popular Action Front (F.R.A.P.).

In the election, Salvador Allende, founder of the Socialist Party, and
losing presidential candidate in 1952, came very close to winning.

This

election also brought into prominence, Eduardo Frei, founder of the
Christian Democratic Party, who garnered 21 percent of the vote.

However,

Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right, became president, beating
Allende by only 33,500 votes.

In 1964 F.R.A.P. again contested the elec-

tions; this time it consisted mainly of the Communist and Socialist parties,
plus the addition of the Radical Party, and some small independent left-
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wing forces.

Howeverj Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the Christian Demo-

crats, won a convincing victory with 56.1 percent of the vote, as against
Allende's 38.9 percent. 3
During the 1960's the .F.R.A:P. disintegrated, and in 1969 a new
alliance was born, Popular Unity.

Its composition was to change slightly

during its period in government;, however, its original membership was as
follows:

the three main parties were the Co~unist Party (CP), Socialist

Party (PS), and the Radical Party (PR).
movements:

In addition, there were three

United People's Action Movement (M.A.P.U.), a leftist offshoot

of the Christian Democratic Party; Independent People's Action (A.P.I.);
and the Social Democrats.

The latter two movements are both micro-

organizations of the center-left. 4

In 1970 this coalition contested the

elections and this time Allende won a plurality of the popular vote and
became President-elect of Chile.
The results of the 1970 Presidential election were: 5
Allende

1,070,334

(36.2%)

Alessandri

1,031,159

(34.9%)

821,801

(27.8%)

Tamie
Null and Blank

( 1.1%)

The U.P., though, should not be seen as a direct descendant of the
1938 Popular Front, because in actual fact there was substantial difference
between th,cm.

The latter was a broad coalition of parties and platforms

which come together to fight fascism.

Also, it never envisaged the destruc-

tion of capitalism, as its succession of conservative leaders and policies
showed.

The Popular Unity was a more unified and cohesive coalition, which

broadly agreed on its objectives, the carryin 6 out of the U.P. program and
a move towards socialism in Chile. 6

The Popular Front of 1938, though,
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can be credited with helping to set a historical precedent, of sorts, for
the U.P., and also to give it a chance to learn from their failures.
!n terms of trying to given an historical introduction to the

Popular Unity period, I think it is also necessary to briefly discuss the
seemingly Rarad·oxical situation in which the Communist Party were politically to the right of the Socialists.

The CP was founded back in June

1912 under the name of the Socialist Workers Party (POS), and it was not
until after the Russian Revolution in 1917 that they became the Connnunist
Party of Chile.

7

It took another ten years before they adopted the

Leninist doctrine of democratic centralism.

The CP was the first nation-

wide working class organization in Chile and it built up strong support
in the trade unions.
In 1933 a new force emerged on the Left in chile, the Socialist
Party, and its origins required it to occupy a position to the left of
the CP.
In 1931 Ibanez' first administration was overthrown and the CP had
become very noticeable as a result of the Stalinist-Trotskyist feud in the
Comintern..' 8 Eventually, then, the Trotskyite elements split from the
Chilean CP and left them to their Stalinist line.

The Trotskyists joined

with a number of other left-wing groups to form the Socialist Party.

Pre-

viously these groups had separately supported the twelve-day Republic of
Marmeduke Grove and Eugenio Matte in 1932.

The Socialist Party, then, was

mainly made up of those whose idelogical affiliation was to the left of
Stalin, and although the SP was Marxist, it did not follow the doctrine
of democratic centralism. 9
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CHAPTER I

THE FIRST SIX MONTHS:

Hypothesis:

A POPULIST PROGRAM

The period immediately after the April 1971 Municipal elec-

tions was an opportune time for Allende to pr~ss forward quickly with the
Unidad Popular (U.P.) program.

The fact that he failed to do so, not only

showed that his policies were basically reformist, but also that his analysis of the deepening class struggle was incorrect.
With the electoral victory of Allende in September 1970 and his
ratification by Congress in the following November, Chile, at least
potentially, moved into the beginnings of the road towards socialism.
However, this potential was not developed by Allende and the U.P., and
in reality they carried out what were basically reformist policies.

The

only sectors who recognized the urgency of pushing forward quickly through
this prerevolutionary stage were the "ultra-left," which included the leftwing of the Socialist Party, the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left),
and the masses who supported them.
The use of the term, "reformist," here does not mean that Allende's
policies were exactly the same as Frei' s had been.

1'.Thereas Frei' s "Revolu-

tion in Liberty" ha•.' been openly reformist, the U .P. program had under.
· 1 to move towar d some rearrangement o f soc1a1
- ~ f orces. l
1ying
potentia

As

James Petras said, "By the midd]e of 1971, the government had taken a series
of measures which, while in themselves not implying a qualitative change in
social relatir,ns, definitely pointed in that direction."

13
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In this chapter I intend to study the policies and programs of
the U.P. from September 1970 until shortly after the April 1971 municipal
elections.

I will try to show that during this period, although the poli-

cies Allende carried out were reformist in nature, in the context of the
Chilean political environment, many of them did represent a step forward
for the working classes.

However, I also intend to show that although

they were a step forward for the workers, Allepde's analysis of the situation prevented the qualitative acceleration of this process and the construction of a through-going socialist program.
Uni dad Popular Program of Government that the,
an extremely important role. 113
initially concentrate.

It was stated in the

11

'tl~w

economy .•• will play

Consequently, it is on this that I will

Three types of economic areas were envisaged, the

first one being the "Area of Social Property."

This entailed the construc-

tion of a dominant state area made up of already-controlled state enterprises plus those that were to be expropriated.

Initially this called

for the nationalization of the basic sources of wealth in Chile, i.e.,
the large mining companies of copper, iron, nitrate and others, which
were controlled by foreign capital and internal monopolies.

Into this

area of nationalized activities will be integrated the following sectors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The large mining companies of copper, nitrate,
iodine, iron and coal;
The country's financial system, especially private
banks and insurance companies;
Foreign trade;
The great distribution enterprises and monopolies;
The strategic industrial monopolies;
In general, all those activities which determine
the country's economic and social development such
as the production and distribution of electrical
energy; rail, air and maritime transportation; communications; the production, refining and distribution of petroleum and its derivatives--including
bottled gas; iron and steel production; cement,
petrochemicals and heavy chemicals, cellulose and
paper.4

The other two economic areas were private property and mixed property, respectively.

The former category would consist of all sectors

of industry, mining, agriculture and services other than those which had
'controlled the market monopolistically, monopolizing state aid and bank
credit and exploiting the other industrial enterprises of the country."

5

The third area, the "Mixed Area," involved a partnership between
private and state enterprises.

This plan to c.:instruct a new economy was

seen as the mainstay of the U.P. program, though some of its other objectives must also be briefly discussed.

Income redistribution by means of

wage and price policies, in the direction of the lower levels of the population, is one of these.

In the domestic field the U.P.'s third major

committment was to carry out large-scale agrarian reform, primarily by
breaking up the latifundios.

In terms of foreign policy and international

objectives, Allende pledged "complete political and economic autonomy of
Chile ... diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world irrespective of their political position and ideology ... more national independence ..• and international solidarity with people's struggle for libera•

tion ..•

II

6

The rhetoric of the U.P. program may sound revolutionary and may
sound socialistic, but in terms of the spirit in which its measures were
i.nterpreted and implemented, they remained populist and reformist.

This

should come as no surprise if one studies the programs and their implementation, and Allende's political background.

Allende was the founder of

the Chilean Socialist Party, and was also its perennial. candidate· for Presi7
.
1952 , at t h e h ea d o f varying
·
· ·
d ent since
coa 1 itions.

also been a senator for twenty-five years. 8

In addition he had

Allende himself, then, was
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steeped in democratic traditions and had functioned with and within bourgeois political institutions.

Consequently then, when Congress imposed

constitutional limitations upon Allende, as part of the bargain for his
ratification as president, he accepted them.

These conditions or consti-

tutional amendments were proposed by the Christian Democratic Party.

These

involved:'- the non-interference by the president in the army, navy, air
force, or carabineros; non-interference with ~he press, radio, schools,
unions, etc., and significantly, the recognition of the unconstitutionality
of "private militias."

As Dudley Seers pointed out, "Allende pledged that

he would respect the constitutional guarantees .... These were not difficult
pledges to give.

·
d to constitutiona
.
.
1·ity. 119
He was area
1
dy cornrnitte

The

opposition parties in congress did not insist on these constitutional
guarantees because they thought that without them, Allende would overthrow
the existing system.

Obviously not, because, if they viewed Allende as a

true revolutionary, they would not have wasted their time drawing up what
would have been, worthless constitutional amendments.

However, they knew

from his background that a complete overthrow of capitalism was not a point
of contention.

Their aim was to shift certain constitutional powers away

from the presidency and towards them--thereby strengthening their position
for the future.
The reformism and respect for legal and democratic processes was
reflected in the make-up of the Unidad Popular coalition.

Some writers,

such as Les Evans, exaggerate the reformist effects the A.P.I.

(Independent

Peoples Action) and the Radical Party had on the U.P. coalition. 10

Admit-

tedly the API was a center-left group and the Radical Party was bourgeois·,bent on political opportunism.

However, these two groups did not form a

large percentage of the total U.P. coalition.

The two main parties, the

11
Socialists and the Communists, were solidly based on the working class.
I agree with Evans though that the U.P. was not socialist in practice,
but in fact, reformist.

Given the rhetoric of the program, however, and

the increasing radicalization of the masses, stagnation at the beginning
of the prerevolutionary stage was not inevitable.

Notwithstanding Allende

himself, Evans saw the brake as being the bourgeois parties in the coalition, whereas I would maintain that the Chile.n Communist Party was best
suited to fit this role as explained in the introduction.

The C.P. was

in many ways the most highly organized and pow,:>.rful party in the coalition; however, it was also to the right of Allende's Socialist Party.
Even more than the S.P. leaderr,hip, the C.P. stressed constitutionality
and legalism, and was prone to advocate slower rather than faster implementation of the U.P. program. 11
of the C.P. has crippled the U.P.

As Kyle Steenland put it, "The attitude
1112

Reformism, then, was seemingly built into the institutional and
ideological framework of the coalition.

However, ac. will be seen, this

reformism was underlayed by a potential to move in a socialist direction.
Consequently, although the measures of the first six months can be criticized for their reformism, early reforms could have been used as a base
to move more rapidly towards increased state power and the construction
of socialism.

This became increasingly clear upon studying the measures

carried out by the U.P. during the first six months.
A number of popular measures were initiated almost immediately,
such as wage increases of at least 30 percent for workers and lower-level
salaried employees, coupled with a simultaneous freezing of prices.

Health

services were improved; a number of political prisoners were freed and riot
police were abandoned.

And "in December 1970 Allende began his well-
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publicized free distribution of half a liter of milk for all children.

In

November and December the U.P. gave away land for popular resorts to
poor schools and to the central labor cot.mcil." 13

From this necessary

popular politiking, Allende's aim was to extend his electoral victory by
implementing short-run economic measures which would consolidate his present support and also attract new support.
In terms of agrarian reform the U.P. ,romised the Chilean peasantry, "a real agrarian reform, which would fulfill the betrayed pledges
of the Christian Democrats, while deepening and extending the rural revolution.1114

During the first six months the U.P. appropriated 3.5 million

acres of land, which represented almost 40 percent of the land area that
the Christian Democrats expropriated in six years.
to end all latifundism by 1973.

Its avowed aim was

The U.P. reforms in the area of land

reform represented an advance for the agricultural workers and peasants.
However, the above figures must be viewed in the light of the fact that
this was not really a change from the policy of Eduardo Frei, but merely
an extension of it.

In fact, the land was expropriated under the terms

of the P.D.C.'s own land reform law of 1967.

In addition, Allende assured

landowners that they would be paid compensation for their land.

Land

reform under Allende, then, cannot be viewed as a socialistic measure,
but more of a social democratic measure.
As so often was to be the case, Allende fot.md that his reformism
(however much he felt it was orientated towards· the W"orkers"-an&.·peasan.ts),
lagged behind the dy~aroism

of the masses.

This was clearly shown by the

"illega1" land seizures which began almost immediately after the U.P. came
to power and continued at an increasing pace.

MacEoin notes that, "By

early 1971, hundreds of farms were being seized each month by groups of
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peasants."

15

These land seizures centered around the southern province

of Cautin, which had Chile's largest concentration of Indians, the country's densest and poorest rural population, and the highest incidence of
rural unemployment.

The mobilization of the Indians and peasants was

organized in part by a section of the MIR, about whom more will be discussed later.

In order not to lose the strong support that they com-

manded from the masses, the U.P. was pressure~ by these events to speed
up the expropriation process, and also to refrain from using actual physical force to prevent these seizures.

After a time, however, Jose Toha,

the U.P. Minister of the Interior, gave a warning that "the government of
President Senor Allende would act vigorously against any armed group
operating in rural areas."

16

Mining industries were also expropriated by the U.P. within the
first six months; the most important being the huge U.S.-owned copper
mines, the latter being nationalized by the middle of July 1971.

In much

of the North American press, nationalization is synonomous with socialism,
however, this was certainly not the case in Chile.

Almost all sectors of

Chilean society agreed upon the need to nationalize copper in terms of
furthering national industrial development and reducing dependence upon
foreign capital.

The consensus that ~xisted in relation to these measures

was begun under Frei's government, by virtue of their Chileanization process.

17

This was extended under the U.P.'s governmental program.

How-

ever, as Laurence Whitehead pointed out, " ... total copper nationalization
was proposed not only by Allende, but also by his Christian Democratic

.

riva 1 for the Presidency, Radomiro Tamie ...

11

18

Even Aressandri, who did

not genuinely favor nationalization, tacitly supported it, in view of the
widespread support for it right across the political spectrum.

20
As can be seen, then, from the nature of its support, nationali-

zation of U.S. copper cannot be viewed as a socialistic measure.

However,

again it does not represent another victory for the masses, the limited
nature of which though needs to be stressed.

MacEoin maintained that the

process of "Chileanization" was dropped in favor of nationalization
because "Chile's ownership of 51 percent of the shares gave it no voice
19
in management or policy."
This is certainl),'9 true, however, the gains
to be made from total nationalization of copper must not be exaggerated.
As Evans pointed out "nationalization in and of itself does not mean that
the working class is in power or that capitalism is being eliminated. 1120
As with the policies concerning agrarian reform, the above nationalizations
only helped to create preconditions from which the beginnings of socialism
could be built.

In no way did they themselves constitute socialism.

This

lack of structural change was further reflected in the very small number
of monopoly industrial enterprises that were nationalized.

The U.P.'s

policy by mid-1971 seemed to be one of intervention only in those enterprises which had paralyzed production.

However, "The government has not

yet specified what industries it plans to expropriate nor has it established a time sequence. 1121

It was estimated that 150 enterprises among

the 30,000 firms and workshops were monopolies to be expropriated.

This

represented less than 1 percent.
The banks were also taken over, eleven of them by April 1971, and
all of them by the end of July 1971.

With control of the banking and

financial stTucture, the potential was there to fund and develop future
socialistic policies.
In the first six months, the U.P. was relatively successful in
implementing the economic core of its program in terms of both its own
goals and guidelines.
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On

April 4, 1971, 280 municipal elections were held, and as they

were the first public test of Allende's administration, they took on the
nature of a plebiscite, for or against the program of the U.P.

The

results reflected the U.P.'s growing support.
CHILEAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 1971 22
.Number

Percent

Partido Socialista
Partido Communista
Partido Radical
Socialista Popular
Social Democrata
Total, Unidad Popular

631,939
479,206
225,851
29,123
38,077
1,404,196

22. 89
17.36
8.18
1.05
1.38
50.86

Partido Democrata Cristiano
Partido Nacional
Democracia Radical
Democrata Nacional

723,623
511,679
108,192
13,435
1,356,929

26.21
18.53
3.91
0.49
49.14

Not only was this a personal victory for Allende, but it was also,
"a strong mandate. 1123

Allende's ow.'1 Socialist Party made the biggest

gains by garnering 22.89 percent of the vote and becoming the second
largest party in Chile.

Not only this but it represented a 65 percent

increase over the vote it received in the 1967 municipal elections.

In

contrast the bourgeois wing of the U.P. fared badly, its vote dropping
from 16.1 percent to 8.1 percent over the same period of time.

The table

below shows the increasing support for Chilean left-wing parties since 1964.

22

THE LEFTS' RISING PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULAR VOTE 1965-71 24

The Parties
Socialist Party
Communist Party
Radical Party
C. D. Party
National Party

Congressional
1965

Municipal
1967

Cdngressional
1969

Municipal
1971

10.3
12.4
13.3
42.3
12. 1

13.9
14.7
16.1
35.6
14.3

12.2
15. 9
13.0
29.8
20.0

22.89
17.36
8.1
26.21
18. 53

Not only did the results legitimize the U.P. victory but they
could have been interpreted as representing an increase in support for
the views of the left-wing section of the U.P.

The left-wing of the

Socialist Party, and the MIR, saw this trend outlined above, and particularly the April municipal election results as a mandate to move forward
with the implementation of the U.P. program.

Paul Sweezy puts forward a

logical and constitutional process by which Allende could have moved
forward.
A draft law abolishing the two-house legislature
and substituting the proposed Popular Assembly
could have been submitted to the Congress. It
would, of course, have been rejected, thus paving
the way for a plebiscite. If the U.P. had then
waged an aggressive campaign educating the voters
on the underlying issues and raising their political consciousness it is reasonable to assume
that the April majority could have been held and
perhaps even increased. The next step would have
been to win a majority of seats in the new Popular
Assembly. With this accomplished, not only could
vitally important legislation which had been blocked
by the old Congress be enacted; equally significant
25
the judiciary could have been reformed and re-staffed.
In its quest for state power the U.P. would then be left to deal with the
military.

This would be more complicated and difficu]t, however, a legal

and constitutional path could still be followed.

Reactionary officers

23
could be retired and loyal officers promoted.

Pay and living conditions

for the rank and file could be improved, and the military link between
the U.S. and Chile could be broken.

Also of extreme importance would be

the construction of a popular militia.

A recognition of the fact that at

some stage violent action may be necessary.
The writer on page 26 of New Chile misinterpreted Allende's aims
and analysis of the situation after April 197\.

The writer in question

maintained that "Allende clearly regarded the results of the municipal
elections as a signal for him to move more directly towards the goals set
out in the U.P. Program of Government."

In reality, this was not the case;

Allende did not proceed to implement the U.P. program in any way that bears
similarity to Sweezy's suggested scenario.

The line that Allende did

actually follow post-April 1971 and the subsequent events will be discussed in a later chapter.

At this point I intend to argue for why I

think Allende should have pressed forward rapidly with his programs at
this point, and also to try and offer some answers as to why he didn't.
As the municipal elections showed, Allende and his Socialist Party
had, through a number of reformist and populist measures, increased significantly their level of popular support.

This support in a large part

came from the success of the short run economic policies discussed
earlier, as these were aimed primarily at the working class and the lower
sections of the middle classes.

Not only this but the masses had shown

themselves willing to mobilize and to push forward the U.P. program at a
fast pace.

Allende was also well-versed from his student days with the

writings of Marx, Lenin, and also Trotsky. 26

He must have been well aware

of the danger of moving toward the revolution too slowly.

Unless the

speed of implementation and general momentum are maintained and increased,
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then the revolutionary process will falter, lose momentum, and be vunerable to attacks by the beurgeoisie,

Rosa Luxemburg makes this point

clearly, " ... either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and
resolute tempo, break down all barriers with an iron hand, and place its
goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backward. 1127
In addition, the class struggle was beginning to come into the
open.

Polarization was slowly beginning to t~ke place and hence if Allende

wanted to move forward constitutionally, then it had to be done before the
classes became completely polarized.

Ever since the election on September

4, a slow simmering, but steady process of polarization of classes had been
taking place in Chile.

Events on both the right and left show this.

The

presence of the center/right and its links with the U.S. were clearly
demonstrated

to Allende in the 1964 Presidential election.

"Frei's cam-

paign [was] designed to scare the electorate away from Allende.
to $1 million per month from U.S. sources, 1128

With up

Laurence Stern maintained

that "Approximately $20 million in U.S. funds was channeled into the Frei
campaign, while at least 100 U.S.
Chile. 1129

'special personnel' were posted to

The report goes on to quote a key U.S. intelligence officer of

the time, who recalled that, "U.S. government intervention in Chile in 1964
was blatant and almost obscene."
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The amount of money pumped into Chile

in the next six years by U.S. government and corporations increased substantially, with a politically motivated aim--to directly and indirectly
prevent the election of a socialist candidate in 1970.

However, their

failure to prevent this occurrence did not signal an end to U.S. machinations.

Under the Nixon administration the "40 Committee," as it was

known, orchestrated and authorized a program of bribes and payments to

25
anti-Allende groups in Chile to prevent his ratification by Congress. 31
The CIA and U.S. corporations such as I.T.T. were involved in similar
activities.

William Merriam, I.T.T. Executive Representative for Inter-

national Trade, summarized a meeting at CIA headquarters.

"Approaches

continue to be made to select members of the Armed Forces in an attempt
to have them lead some sort of uprising--no success to date. 1132

Following

this, the United States strategy moved to a d{fferent plane and the offensive was continued in the economic area with the purpose of creating the
right political and economic conditions necessary to precipitate a coup.
"A consensus emerged between Kissinger, the CIA and I.T.T.

The conver-

gence of views was reached shortly after Allende was confirmed in the
Presidency: by common consent the strategy consisted of maximizing
external economic pressures on the vunerable points of the Chilean
economy. 1133

Economic sabotage by the Right was also being carried out

on the domestic front.
their savings.

Wealthy Chileans by the hundreds were withdrawing

From September 1970 onwards, capital flight began.

Also,

"the inflow of capital from abroad stopped in September and new domestic
private investment practically halted." 34

The conservative press publi-

cized the difficulties caused by this in anti-socialist tones, and landowners continued to sabotage the U.P. program by using all their means to
block and discredit land reform.
The assassination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General
Rene Schneider, on October 22, 1970, was another reminder to Allende that
he was dealing with an opposition which was prepared to use subtle and
unsubtle means to bring about his downfall.

Although not working together

in any cohesive manner, the differing elements on the right were united on
one thing, opposition to Allende.

This opposition was present before the
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September elections and continued to grow after it, through covert and
overt actions (a number of which have been mentioned above).

As yet

rightist opposition was not unified or mobilized on any large and organized scale; this was not to happen until the Bosses Strike of 1972.
However, the portents for the future were clear.

The power of the

right with backing from the U.S. could not be underestimated.

They were

slowly growing in strength and in unity, bidi~g their time until they
felt that conditions were favorable for them to strike at the Allende
government.

The conditions or situations they were primarily interested

in were those of the other slowly polarizing sector of Chilean society-the working class.
The masses then, were also going through a polarization process;
the evidence of which showed itself clearly in the results of the municipal elections.
its vote.

The Socialist Party in the coalition significantly increased

The "ultra left" wanted the socialist spirit of the U.P. program

to be carried out to the socialist letter.

The land seizures already dis-

cussed demonstrated that concrete action was what was wanted, and fast.
Also, workers in industries during the first few months demanded from
Allende that they be allowed to take over and run the factories.

Much of

the initial workers' demands and mobilizations occurred with backing from
the MIR, the revolutionary left group, which gave critical support to the
U.P. program.
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The masses, after years of poor living and exploitation,

saw the Allende government and the measures that it had already carried
out, as a sign, a hope, a path ou~ of poverty.

By virtue of their life

experiences pre-U.P. government and their present rising expectations,
they developed a sense of urgency which could not always be contained
within the legal, constitutional reforms put forward by Allende.
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A radicalization and polarization, then, has been taking place
among the workers, and again the writing was on the wall for Allende.

If

he could not move at the same speed as the masses then they would leave
him behind.
militia.

This was especially true in the area of building a popular

The workers did not have the same faith in the neutrality of

the military and police as Allende seemed to have.

His refusal to arm

and/or mobilize the masses on any continuous ~asis, pushed the masses
even more into the arms of the MIR.

Allying with this group became a

natural progression as their radicalization and polarization increased.
Unfortunately, the MIR were also incapable of providing the type of
leadership necessary to build a mass revolutionary movement.
I have tried to illustrate here that during the first six months
the polarization process was beginning to occur, but as yet had not reached
coup d' etat conditions.

The forces of the Right were still partially dis-

oriented by Allende's presidential victory; however, they were increasingly
beginning to agree on a basic strategy.

One of the reasons they were still

disoriented over their strategy was the problem of how to deal·with the
increasing mass support for Allende, which itself was radicalizing and
polarizing.
In summary, then, Allende had conditions in his favor, post-April
1971, economically and politically.

Why then did he not press on and

quickly implement the U.P. program?
Without doubt there were a number of factors which accounted for
this~ however, one of the main ones revolved around Allende's mistaken
analysis of the situation.

Allende's long-standing respect for constitu-

tionalism, legality and bourgeois institutions, overshadowed one of the
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basic tenets of the philosophy he himself advocate4.

In his conversa-

tions with Regis Debray, Allende said, " ... we have not forgotten a fundamental principle of Marxism:

the class struggle."
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However, his failure

to implement the U.P. program after the April 1971 election illustrates
that his analysis of the situation showed a severe misreading of the
class struggle and the polarization process.

For an avowed Marxist,

Allende did not have a very clear picture of \he role of the military.
On the one hand, he half-believed the now shattered myth of the apolitical
and non-interventionist nature of the Chilean armed forces.
lute confidence in the loyalty of the armed forces.

"I have abso-

Our forces are pro-

fessional forces at the service of the state, of the people. 1137
the military statistics were ominous.

However,

In relation to its population,

Chile had the largest armed forces of any South American country, and was
also the largest recipient of U.S. military aid, outside of Brazil.
also received substantial military training from the U.S.
was carried out in the U.S.).

Chile

(much of which

For example, for the period 1960-65, 2,064

Chilean soldiers were trained in the

u.s. 38

Alain Joxe, a French sociologist, concluded, after a study of the
Chilean armed forces, that it is not that they are apoliti(·al, but that
they usually manage to play their role inconspicuously.

Their non-

intervention is "a latent and permanent participation in the political
game, not a simple abstention.

When they intervene, as in 1891 and from

1924-1931, they remodel the state to serve the upper and middle sectors
and the bureacracy.
countries."

One intervention in Chile is worth ten in other
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The other half of Allende's mistaken analysis stemmed from his
fear of provoking military intervention by the armed forces by pushing

29
forward too quickly with the U.P. program.

The analysis was mistaken again

in that as the polarization of classes continued, violent intervention at
some stage was inevitable.

A more realistic analysis would have been to

realize that violent confrontation would have to occur, and consequently
must be prepared for.

The optimum time to prepare for such an eventuality

was again after the April 1971 elections.
However, Allende, although an avowed ijarxist, failed to diagnose
the class struggle in Marxist terms.

The April 1971 elections, the end

of the first six months in power, marked a tremendous opportunity for
Allende, and the workers to move toward a construction of the beginnings
of socialism.
However, he failed to do so, and as a result of the path he did
follow, he left the very people who supported him, the workers, open and
vulnerable to the intensifying Rightist offensive.
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CHAPTER II
ALLENDE'S REFORMISM CONTINUES AS THE POLARIZATION PROCESS INTENSIFIES

Hypothesis:

As the polarization proce3s intensified Allende became

increasingiy reformist and more compromising towards the opposition,
causing him to miss another opportunity to move towards the buildi~g
of a socialist society.
The full significance of the April 1971 municipal elections only
became fully apparent upon a closer study of the changing electoral vote
of the political parties in Chile.

Referal back to the table on page 10,

Chapter I, helps to show this in part.

In the last chapter I used the

data in the table to show the rising percentage of the popular vote garnered by the Left from 1965-71.

However, a second examination of the

results showed a growing pola1·ization of the Chilean population.

The

traditional workers parties, the Socialist and Communist parties, both
increased their percentage share of the vote in the last two congressional
and municipal elections.

Not only this but the conservative National Party

also made significant gains, partly at the expense of the P.D.C. and partly
at the expense of the smaller parties.

In fact, its percentage gain from

the 1965-69 Congressional elections was larger than both the Socialist and
Communist respective gains put together.

These results and the ensuing

political maneuvers within and outside the U.P., reflected the growing
politicization and polarization that had been taking place.
notes this polarization process.
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Lawrence

34

Another important change in the Chilean political
climate is the polarization of the electorate and
the political leadership.
This polarization can
be seen in a variety of ways, in the inflamed political rhetoric of the 1960's, the serious increase
in political violence, the platforms of the major
competing arties, and the results of the recent
elections.

1

The varied makeup of the component parts of the U.P. and its lack
of unity of purpose was shown by the increasing fragmentation of some of
its members.

On August 31, 1971, the Radical Party convention ended in a

split among its ranks; a new group being formed called the Independent
Radical Movement (Movimiento Radical Independiente-MRI).

In addition the

P.D.C. und•erwent another split in that M.A.P.U. lost a number of top leaders
to the new Christian Left (Izquierda Cristiana).

The most notable of these

leaders being Jacques Chonchol, the Minister of Agriculture.

Both the

Christian Left and the MRI gave support to the Allende government, however,
the latter eventually went over to the ranks of the opposition.

At this

time, then, the U.P. government was on the way to becoming "little more
than a convenient label attached to whatever combination of parties and
groups may from time to time support the Allende administration." 2
Not only was polarization reflected in electoral trends and political maneuverings, but in other Left/Right mobilizations also.

The MIR

interpreted the U.P. gains in the April elections as a reason to move
forward and increase its organizational activities among the masses of
students, peasants, and workers.

MIR spokesmen claimed that their wember-

ship had quadrupled and that they were increasingly becoming the moving
. new revo 1 utionary
·
·
·
3
f orce in
wor k ers an d peasants organizations.

Some

MIRistas claimed that they could put from twenty to thirty thousand people
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into battle immediately, armed with weapons stolen from armories during
the past three years, and trained during people's militia training ses·
d uring
·
sions
t h e past year. 4

Its strength was impressively demonstrated

at the funeral service for one of their most important leaders, Luciana
Cruz, who died in a car accident on August 14.

Thirty thousand people

marched through the streets in his funeral - procession, n{fu-ting those
who predicted that the MIR would disappear if .it didn't join the ranks
of the U.P. 115

The retention of this support, and the increasing autonomy

of the workers movement was shown by the setting up of a "People's
Assembly" in July 1972.

This brought together many of the working class

groups and organizations to discuss the concept and implementation of
"people's power."
Without doubt the "ultraleft" was increasing its mobilization
activities, and as polarization continued so its supporters increased in
number.

Part of these activities were aimed at penetrating the army's

lower echelons in an attempt to split and weaken the armed forces.

However,

in the area of the armed forces, the terrorist groups of the Right had more
influence in the shape of "Patria y Libertad" (Fatherland and Freedom),
"Grupo Anticomrnunista" (G:&-.A. {;,Cl.:.. anti- comniuri:ist gro-tip) ·and NECif"{We
sell out Chile).
army.
right.

Jon' t

These all had strong links with the upper ranks of the

The battle lines were being drawn by both the extreme left and
But whereas the "moderate left", in the shape of the U.P. Jeader-

ship, was continuing its strategy of adhering to the Constitution, the
Christian Democrats were increasingly throwing their weight behi.nd the
conservative right.

The summer of 1971 marked the beginnings of a closer

alliance between the aforementioned parties, both in and outside of Congress.
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In October 1971 the P.D.C. and the rightist parties attempted to
assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by
means of a constitutional amendment which Allende refused to accept.

By

January 1972 "Frei. •• returned to active political campaigning to 'save
democracy' by means of a fully fledged e_lectoral and congressional alliance with the Right, and the Christian Democrats approved their first
impeachment of one of Allende's ministers. 116

t>n the electoral front an

informal alliance of the P.DC and the conservative right led to striking
victories for them in two January Congressional by-elections.

Apart from

being a political setback for Allende, it had added significance in that
the opposition had ran on the platform of giving the voters an opportunity
"to take a stand against the government's program to construct socialism
in Chile. 117

The cementing of relations on the right was further demon-

strated by the formation of C.O.D.E. (Confederation Democratica), whose
job was to prepare joint lists for the March 1973 Congressional elections. 8
Cooperation between the opposition parties was also evident in the organization of street demonstrations, business and paramilitary groups and the
intensification of propaganda and political indoctrination by the conservative media. 9

As Petras noted, "All the Right's organizational efforts,

political and military, were directed toward mass mobilization to create
the basis for a change in government or at least in program. 1110

The

mounting offensive by the Right reached its high point in October 1972,
with what became known as the "Bosses Strike".

The situation and condi-

tions surrounding this strike will be discussed in detail later, however,
at this point I am going to discuss why, post-April 1971, the class struggle
intensified and also examine the U.P.'s response to this intensification.
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The Allende government, during its first months in power, had
been able to stimulate the economy in the short run by a number of populist measures.

Pedro Vuskovic was Allende's Minister of Economic Affairs,

and his program had three main objectives:

(1) To restructure the Chilean

economy into three spheres of ownership; a socially-owned property sector,
one of joint ownership and a private property sector; (2) To achieve a
rapid and substantial growth in the wage earne~'s share of national income;
(3) These above changes will form the basis of a new development model
from which the "socialist transformation of the Chilean economy is begun. 1111
However, these were largely based on using up unused industrial capacity
and correcting inefficiencies and corruption.

In addition, they were

carried out at a time when the Right was disoriented

and disunified.

By

the fall of 1971 this excess capacity had been exhausted and unemployment
was low.

The only way the U.P. could have increased production rapidly

would have been by the expansion of the state sector, coupled with the
implementation of a more rationalized plan of production.

The uplift in

the economy, then, had come to a standstill and its expansion was not
possible due partly to sabotage by the Right and U.S. covert intervention.
As Kyle Steenland pointed out " ••. the Chilean bourgeoisie ••• " by use of
" ... its Congressional majority and its control of the majority of the
media (65 percent of the newspapers printed, for example, support the
Right) was able to block theexpansion of the state sector. 1112

Also, in

June 1972, Vuskovic was replaced by Orlando Millas, a Communist who followed a policy of limit:ing the size of the social-property area in order
to placate the middle sectors and the Christian Democrats.
I
•
•
1 y re f ormist
•
l'ine. 13
All en des
increasing

This showed
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Actions by the U.S. and a number of its corporations played a
large part in bringing about worsening economic conditions.

The question

of intervention in Chilean affairs by the U.S. government and U.S. corporations will be examined in detail in a later chapter.

At this juncture I

intend only to discuss it briefly as it related to the increasing economic
sabotage and class polarization.
Having failed to prevent the election .m,d confirmation of Allende
as President, the White House and the National Security Council "settled
on an overall strategy of controlled escalation of hostile measures in
which periods of conflict would alternate with periods of negotiatJon. 1114
Its main objective seemed to be to try to instigate situations (such as
the October strike), which would bring about economic dislocation.

With

the benefit of hindsight, Petras speculated that there were three parts
to the U.S. plan for economic dislocation:

(1) an international credit

squeeze, (2) the elaboration of an ideology of "lack of credit-worthiness"
based on poor economic conditions.

(Conditions which the U.S., in large

part, had manufactured themselves by the credit blockade), (3) the identification of gradual economic deterioration with internal government policy,
thus creating the economic basis for polarizing Chilean society in a
manner favorable to the groups of owners of large properties.15
The U.S., through the World Bank, Export-Import Bank, and the IMF,
denied new credits to Chile.

The latter institution, also on government

orders, hindered the renegotiation of Chile's foreign debt in the Paris
talks of early 1972.

Pressures such as these, in addition to the drop in

world copper prices, cost Chile dearly in foreign exchange.

The Chilean

economy has a historic dependence on copper and hence when its price

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

--- - - - - -
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dropped this had serious consequences for the economy.

In 1969 copper

sold for 66.56 cents a pound, but by 1972 it fetched only 48.20 cents.
Chilean authorities estimated that for every cent decline in the price
of copper, they lost $15 million each year.

In addition, American com-

panies such as Anaconda and Kennecott were partially successful in
blocking Chilean copper sales to Europe. 16

This was especially damaging

as Chile's economy was (and is) closely tied ~o the American market and
the dollar.

Goods became scarce, especially food and machine parts, as

fewer dollars could now be spent on imports.

Yet, as a result of Allende's

social measures, demands for goods had increased, and this, tied to the
printing of large amounts of new money, caused inflation to rise to
incredible new levels.
cent.

By December 1972 inflation was running at 164 per-

The U.S. did not limit itself to the use of credit squeezes, but it

also strengthened its contacts with the Chilean armed forces by increasingly
offering them opportunities to buy armaments and vehicles.

Following the

compromise solution to the October strike, bilateral talks were proposed
by the U.S., and they did take place.

However, this seemed as though it

was nothing more than the "negotiation phase" of the U.S. strategy.

It

can be argued that meaningful negotiations never took place, nor were they
intended to (by the U.S.).

The American government used the talks to gain

first-hand knowledge of the mood of the Chileans and their feelings toward
the U.S.
Polarization, then, apart from being the natural concomitant of
the class struggle, increased in intensity due to the economic disruption
brought about by the U.S. and the Chilean bourgeoisi,e.

'As _a reaction -to

the above, small businessmen and lower middle-class elements who once
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supported Allende, now went over to the side of the opposition.

The

working classes showed great tolerance of the situation, though some of
them became demoralized by Allende's indecisiveness and fell prey to
rightist propaganda.

The class struggle was going on all around him

and yet it seemed that Allende could not grasp the solid logic of the
situation that was being played out with every passing day.
to do so was to be a fatal one.

His failure

Pablo Lira hati this to say about Allende's

vacillations.
" ... in Chile in 1972 as in other historical

experiences, political weakness in the face
of the middle classes' political representatives, was not only no help in cementing a
class alliance, but actually drove the middle
sectors toward those classes or class factions
that showed greater political strength. 11 17
The increasing polarization and severe economic problems eventually exploded openly in the October 1972 strike.

It is my contention that

the situation brought about by the strike gave Allende the opportunity to
move ahead again with mass mobilization and the chance to begin building
towards a socialist society.
and he had failed to take it.

His last opportunity had been in April 1971,
In October 1972, even though the conditions

were much more difficult, if he had acted swiftly and decisively, then
there was a chance of success.

In fact, the course he did take reinforced

the reformist and capitulatory nature of the U.P. leadership.
In the second week of October the crisis began when a nationwide
truck strike caused serious shortages of gasoline and flour.

This resulted

in a declaration of martial law by the Allende government in a number of
provinces.

The truckers' strike was precipitated by the government's

refusal to meet the demands of the Confederation of Truck Owners for higher
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cargo rates.

Allende attempted to stop the strike by arresting the presi-

dent of the Confederation, Leon Vilarin, and 160 owners and drivers.

Two

days later on October 12, the small businessmen, retailers, builders and
large farmer associations came out on strike in sympathy with the truckers.
The momentum of the situation continued to increase as civil servants,
ba>nk employees and some high school and university students also came out
on strike.

These were quickly followed by do 4 tors, dentists, and lawyers.

Without doubt this was a politically motivated strike against the Allende
government by the rightist elements in Chile.

O'Brien saw the objective

of the strike as being "to make the existing shortages acute by preventing
the flow of food and fuel to consumers and paralyzing production and trade.
This economic offensive, together with the activities of terrorist groups,
was intended to create a climate of chaos and lead to the kinds of clashes
that would provoke workers into a violent reaction, thus inviting the
intervention of the armed forces and the overthrow of the gove~nment. 1118
However, this did not seem to have been the avowed intention of the Christian Democrats who had strongly supported the strike. 19

Jaime Castillo,

a political analyst for the Christian Democratic Party, maintained that
the aim of the strike was not "to overthrow Allende, or make him renounce
his program, but to put him back in his place, within the Constitution and
using only laws to carry out his program. 1120

At this·point in time, then,

the P.D.C. were the guiding force of the Right, and Frei the master coordinator.

David F. Belnap saw him as "a behind the scenes compromiser ...

an elder statesman" with an " ... ambition to lead a united opposition."21
This again demonstrated clearly the machinations of the opposition in
that if they could not bring him down immediately, they certainly could

42

bend the rules in their favor again, while waiting and planning for the
eventuaL~overthrow.·,
There were two main reasons why the strike did not precipitate a
coup; the actions of the workers and the armed forces.

The armed forces

cooperated to a certain extent in organizing, with the workers, the transportation and distribution of fuel, and hence, showed they had a certain
formal loyalty to the government.

As yet, th~ armed forces were not com-

pletely decided about their future stance, in relation to the carrying
out of a coup d'etat, and hence the plotting of the "ultraright" elements
of the Rightist alliance did not reach fruitition in the October strike.
One of the main reasons for the behavior of the armed forces and
the failure of the bourgeoisie to realize their strike objectives was the
clearly demonstrated power of the workers during the strike period.

Indus-

tries were taken over and kept running by the workers and distribution
organizations were set up.

In each cordon (industrial sector) a coilllllittee

representing the workers of all the factories was formed.

Its role was to

order the seizure of any factory closed by its owners, name a new management team, and resume production and distribution.

Simultaneously, organ-

izations were established to mobilize and train the members of the coilllllunity
in maintaining order and defending the factories.

In the housing areas and

slums, residents were organized into "commandos comunales" (coilllllunity commands).

These incorporated such previously existing units as, industrial

unions, health boards, neighborhood committees, student and farmer-worker
organizations (the latter in semi-rural areas).

The prime role of the com-

andos was the distribution of food and other supplies, political education,
and the creation of self-defense forces.

The spontaneity of the workers in
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the organization of these bodies, however, should not be overestimated.
O'Brien saw the situation as one in which "Almost spontaneously workers
came together at local and regional levels, unified their organizations
and resolved the concrete problems caused by the strike."

22

A more real-

istic assessment of the situation was one of crediting the MIR with an
initiating role.

As McEoin maintained, "MIR played a principal part in

the organization of the response to the Octob~r lock-outs. 11 23

This was

certainly true because up until this point the workers had always channelled their struggles through the CUT and the unions.

However, the

workers' movements were not tightly controlled by the MIR and the workers
did not regard themselves as being under MIR's control or restricted to
their guidelines.
In my opinion there were a number of important lessons for Allende
to learn from the steadily increasing polarization period, post-April 1971,
and in particular from the October crisis.

However, Allende refused to

accept the dynamics of the situation and the possibilities that evolved
from the workers' mobilization.

So reformism and compromise continued.

Allende ended the strike by following the path of compromise, as strongly
advocated by the C.P.

He accepted the resignation of the whole cabinet

and appointed military men to head three key ministries:
Mining, and Public Works.
into the cabinet:

the Interior,

Two workers' representatives were also brought

Luis Figueiou, as Minister of Works and Rolando Calderon,

as Minister of Agriculture.

However, this was more of a token sop to the

Left as it was very clear that the military representatives held the powerful positions. 24
In terms of the struggle for socialism, Allende's handling of the
October 1972 strike showed again clearly the reformist and conciliatory
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nature of the U.P. leadership, and its lack of long-term insight.

As I

have tried to show throughout this paper, Chilean society had become
increasingly polarized, and Allende showed his weakness by not responding
decisively to this.

Morris pointed out one of the consequences of follow-

ing such a path " .•• the government would continue speaking the rhetoric
of socialism, yet would become increasingly conservative, leading the
masses astray and providing no leadership at ohe critical moments of
Chilean history. 1125

Not only this, but by his vacillations, Allende

lost much of his earlier middle class support (as discussed earlier).
Fidel Castro, when he visited Chile, summed up the situation, "You're
going through that period in the process in which the fascists--to call
them by their right name--are trying to beat you out of the middle strata
of the population.

There is a specific moment in every revolutionary pro-

cess when fascists and revolutionaries engage in a struggle for the support of the middle strata. 1126

By his weakness Allende lost this struggle.

Decisive action by Allende could have resulted in the polarization of the
middle class to the left, however, the reverse was the case, and they polarized to the right.
Allende's reformism seemed to have propelled him on the road of
short-run compromises, which would stall any attempted coup d'etat while
waiting for the March 1973 Congressional elections~-

If this was ever an

alternative, it had by post-Ocotober 1972 lost much of its viability.

In

order for Allende to have fundamentally changed the present balance of power,
he would have needed to have secured more than 50 percent of the vote, ,ior
alternativel;y. get lei:;s than 33. 3_ percen~ of tlie. vot~ •.. Given the po_liti,:a~
strat_egies _,q( _b9.th the major _pe>),itic;{ll forces at the time>_ neither result
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seemed likely.
lished.27

As we know, neither of Lhe above results were accomp-

The U.P. made some significant gains, however, Allende must

have been naive to think that an increase in their vote in March would
help halt the polarization process and end violence and disruption.

The

Right was already geared to overthrow Allende when the conditions became
favorable.

Adherence to the constitution was only viable when it suited

their strategy, and Allende should have realiz~d this and begun his own
mobilizations immediately to defend himself and the workers.

I am not

suggesting that Allende should not have participated in the elections,
but what I am suggesting is that to base his whole political strategy
around it, was a mistaken analysis.

Political power and initiative was

moving into the streets and Allende's plans and strategies should have
reflected this.
A stalemate situation came about after the elections and Allende
was now set on playing the role of compromiser to the bourgeoisie until
the 1976 Presidential elections.

As Steenland pointed out, "This would

mean the Allende government resting on the laurels of its most antiimperialist and anti-monopolist reforms, while indefinitely postponing
the building of socialism--in other words, the strategy of the C.P. 11 28
The reformism of the U.P. and the increasing influence of the C.P.,
then, has been clearly demonstrated.

Allende solved nothing by his action

of bringing the military into the cabinet.

James Petras analyzed the situ-

ation after the Ocotber strike, "The dramatic confrontation in October
1972 posed the question of social power in the most decisive manner;
Allende's "compromise"--bringiilg the armed fo;rces::in~Q the.<;R~inet-:--;has_ only
temporarily postponed the final denouemenL- -: . The economic:·p_r9bl~s Qf: E
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the country can be dealt with only when one or the other social class is
firmly in control of the process of production. 1129
If socialism was ever going to be built, then the social class
that had to gain control was the working class, and the oppor1·unity came
again to Allende to attempt this in October 1972.

Increasing political

polarization was by this stage a fact of life, however, Allende allowed
the balance of the class struggle to be tippe~ against him by his reformist policies.
The working class and peasants had fought a strong defensive battle
against the opposition's economi.c sabotage attempts which culminated in
the 1972 strike.

Factories were occupied, production was continued and

the distribution of goods was carried out--all by the mobilization of the
workers.

"Punta Final" realized the significance of this 1

" •••

the work-

ing class has successfully invaded various prerogatives of the state.

It

has shown that it is perfectly capable, not only of excluding the bourgeoisie from the economic life of the country but of taking the state
into its own hands.

That is the great lesson of the crisis. 1130

Here, then, were popular organizations of "dual" or "counterpower"
31
. h h a d grown up 1n
. response t o t h e R"ig h t 's o ff ensive.
·
wh 1c

The very

growth of these o,rganizations and the role they played showed the increasing class consciousness of the workers and a self-realization of their
part in the revolutionary process.

The strengthening and development of

these workers' organizations could have been the beginnings of a move
towards the building of socialism.

In addition, the workers' organiza-

tions should have been armed by Allende as a logical outgrowth of the
formation of vigilante groups to protect the factories from right-wing
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sabotage.

As Evans said, " ... if there were a mass workers militia it is

likely that soldiers and police taking the side of the people would be
attracted to it. 1132
Without doubt the obstacles to constructing socialism at this
point were much greater than in April 1971, however, the condition of the
class struggle, if it was to be won by the workers, demanded such action.
The Right was plainly intensifying its offensfve strategy, and hence
Allende should have responded in kind.

As mentioned previously, the

workers' organizations should have been strengthened, developed and a
popular militia formed.

Potential new institutions of dual power should

have been created in addition to the ones thrown up by the October strike,
and an aggressive policy of mobilizing the masses should have been undertaken.

Due to the U.P.'s continued failure to mobilize the masses and the

MIR's failure to provide adequate leadership, there still remained in Chile,
large sectors of the masses which had not yet been mobilized.
third of the proletariat was organized

Only one-

in unions, and also the shantytown

and community dwellers (the poorest strata of Chilean society), had not
been organized to their fullest potential. "In the Popular Unity view they
remained passive agents ....

Thus the tendency for Allende's government to

.
. 1 arge d ynam1c
. .1n
. d ustr1es
·
·
d ,, 33
re 1 y f un d amenta 11yon t h e pro 1 etar1at
1n
continue.

As Steenland claimed, "There are more than enough popular forces to mobilize,
once these disinherited and exploited groups are convinced that they are
struggling for real social and political power and not just the replacement
of a few Congressmen, by a few others. 1134
The need to move away from the C.P. line to that of the revolutionary left, should have been seen as a necessity by Allende, even though there
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was a fear of provoking a military coup.

However, if Allende had followed

the teachings of his own avowed Marxism, he would have realized that the
class struggle would sooner or later, have produced a violent confrontation.

Hence, a move toward the line of the revolutionary left and mass

mobilization should have been the most logical alternative to take in
that at this stage of the polarization process, the impending inevitability
of confrontation should have been realized ana prepared for.

Admittedly,

the above alternative would have required an end to inter-party sectarianism within the U.P., and a closer cooperation between the MIR and the U.P.
Again, th:is would have required strong, decisive action by Allende to
struggle against the difficulties involved in such a move.

But as we know

what happened was the continuation of the "timid and permissive policies
of the Allende-Communist Party leadership toward the bourgeoisie."35
The populist reformism of Allende's first six months, then, evolved
into weak, ever-rightward moving policies which increasingly ignored the
aspirations and mobilizations of the masses.

As political polarization

intensified, the compromising of Allende and the U.P. leadership, pushed
it into a vulnerable "centre" position in the ensuing class struggle.
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CHAPTER III
THE FINAL OVERTHROW
Hypothesis:

Allende misunderstood the intensifying nature of the class

struggle, and as a result of this, became incr~asingly reliant on the
armed forces and hence helped bring about his own downfall and that of
the working class.
I have already discussed some .Of the implications of the March
1973 e.lections in the previous chapter, however, the concept of its
position as a "watershed" in the class struggle merits further discussion.
Without doubt the Right had been increasing its offensive against the
government prior to the March elections, but even at that time sections
of the Right such as the P.n.C. were still considering legalistic means
of eventually defeating Allende.

It was clear that the Right was stunned

and dismayed by the election results.

To reiterate on the results briefly,

Allende won 44 percent of the vote in March 1973, compared with the 36.3
percent that elected him in September 1970.

As Zimblast and Stallings

pointed out, "This made Allende the first Chilean president since the
Second World War to increase his election support after two and a half
years in office. 111

This achievement was all the more significant as it

happened within an environment of dire economic and social difficulties.
The message, as interpreted by the Right, seemed to be then that even in
the face of some of the worst social and economic conditions to face the
country in modern history, the government's strategy of shifting the
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pattern of rewards and punishments had payed off, politically. 2

The

leaders in the U.P. government saw the results as a sign of electoral
support for their reformist policies and the strategy of the peaceful
road.

Allende failed to realize, however, that the class struggle had

reached such a point that the electoral mandate he received was no
longer viable for his proposed course of action.

In fact, the election

results by their very nature precluded "the pe!lceful road" to socialism.
Parts of the bourgeoisie, who earlier had entertained ideas of a
legalistic solution (as advocated by the P.D.C.), now saw the support of
the Left growing and prospects of increased U.P. activity in the implementation of their program.

This left the way open for the most reaction-

ary element of the Right to increase its dominance of the bourgeoisie.
The Right was also inclined to move more wholelistically towards extraconstitutional maneuvers due to the fact that in its opinion, " ... the
government was no longer in control of the revolutionary process and
however much it might be prepared to surrender, the masses would not
accept any deals. 113

The idea of serious negotiation and compromise with

the government was then eventually discarded by the Right.
In this particular instance, the analysis of the situation by the
opposition had been more accurate than that of Allende's.

By giving the

U.P. 44 percent of the vote the workers were not necessarily endorsing
Allende's policies, but trying to ensure the posit:ion of the U.P. whose
existence was an absolute necessity for the prospect of any revolutionary
advance.

Although the U.P. was not a revolutionary government, without

it, the implementat:ion of socialism would have little or no chance.

The

Right was already aware of what the masses were saying, and they realized
that they (the masses) had the potential to realize their aims.
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Lawrence saw the March 1973 election results as being almost the
single factor which caused the intervention by the military and Allende's
overthrow.

He maintained that, " ... intervention came about because of

the success rather than the failures of the Allende government •••. The outcome of the congressional elections of March 1973 were crucial to the fall
of the Allende regime. 114

To a certain extent the election was a "water-

shed" in the political polarization proeess, but it did not in itself
bring about the military coup.

The class struggle had been going on now

for two and a half years, and its own dialectic

would sooner or later

have caused one side or the other to take control.

The election, then,

was just one part of this class struggle, and although it did intensify
the confrontation, and increase the influence of the reactionary elements, its importance must not be over-exaggerated.

Lawrence's theory

that it was Allende's successes rather than failures which caused his
downfall is also an interesting one, although it is very subjective and
incomplete.

I would maintain that it is just as valid to argue that it

was Allende's continued failure to mobilize the masses and move towards
a revolutionary situation that was the cause of his downfall.
The effect of the :March election results are then open to differing interpretations, however, without doubt it reflected the ever-intensifying polarization process.
Not only did the U.P. expand its base of support, but the rightwing National Party won an additional three seats in the Senate and a substantial number in the Chamber, partly at the expense of their ally, the
ChristianDemocrats.

This was interesting as the National Party had con-

sistently campaigned on the platform that they wanted " ... Allende's head,
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and the elimination of the Communist Party. 115

The Christian Democrats,

on the other hand, in their campaign., had claimed that they didn't want
to overthrow Allende, but only hoped that he would rectify his errors.
The increasing polarization process was also noted by Jonathan Kandell
in the March 6, New York Times.

"Splinter parties on both sides lost

heavily as Chileans cast their votes for the big parties in the two
electoral alliances, the Christian Democrats aud Nationals, and the
Socialists and Communists. 116

The political forces in Chile ,:_then, were

allying themselves into two opposing camps.
The period from the March 4 elections to the eventual coup d'etat
was characterized by an escalation of the Rightist offensive.

It is my

contention that because of Allende's indecisiveness and failure to move
to the left, he became more reliant on the military and eventually placed
himself in an untenable position from which there was no escape.

At this

point, though, Allende's and the military's actions need to be put in the
context of the overall intensification of the Rightist offensive.
On March 27 Allende announced a new all-civilian cabinet after
accepting the resignation of the three generals, a move by the generals
which on the surface seemed to be at odds with the increasing political
polarization and the role of the military.

Some saw the resignations as

a concession to the Left, however, it could and was also viewed as a
tactical maneuver.

The Right saw the situation as one in which a violent

overthrow of the government was going to be necessary and hence, for the
generals to remain in the cabinet would have served little purpose, and
would, in fact, have restrained their movements.

Not only this, but the

resignations were intended to allay the growing fears (especially among
the "ultra-left") of a coup, whereas in reality the battle lines for
Allende's overthrow were more clearly being drawn.
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The Right continued to undermine the economy in a number of ways.
In Congress the P.N. and P.D.C. joined together to drastically reduce the
government's budget, and this consequently left many social programs and
the state r,ector of the economy underfinanced.

The r,nly way the U.P.

could pay for these (within the legalistic framework in which they worked),
was by deficit spending, a measure which further aggravated Chile's inflation rate.

The U.P. also presented a bill wh:i..ch made it a civil crime to

hoard or engage in black market activities and economic sabotage; the P.N.
and P.D.C., though, combined to defeat it. 7

The opposition also intro-

duced constitutional amendments which attempted to dismantle much of the
Social Area, and reverse the agrarian reform. 8
These Congressional maneu·,;-ers were supplemented by increased agitation and calls for civil disobedience.

In the October owners' strike,

the bourgeoisie had failed to achieve its objectives because the working
class had not supported them, but in actual fact had actively opposed
them.

Cons,!quently, the Right realized the value of causing intra-class

conflict among the workers in an attempt to divide the working class and
lessen its pow,::•.r.

In April 1973 the Right took the opportunity to carry

out such a maneuver.
Due to a misunderstanding between the U.P. and. the El Teniente
miners there was some confusion caused concerning wage increases to cover
the cost of inflation.

The miners became convinced that they were entitled

to more than they received, though their expectations would have put themselves in a privileged position vis-a-vis the rest of the working class.
No small part of this convincing came as a result of Right-wing organization at the mines and eventually the miners were convinced to go on strike. 9
The strike did not in any real terms achieve the object of dividing the

57

working class as the other large copper mines refused P.D.C. entreaties
to stage a sympathy strike.
coup on June 29.

The strike finally ended after the abortive

However, the strike wreaked havoc with Chile's already

weakened economy, and it also demonstrated Allende's weakness and poor
grasp of the situation.lo
Allende's distance from the masses, and his weakness allowed a
situation to develop in which the Right was ab].e to organize and provoke
a strike which caused great confusion among U.P. supporters.
Times editorial set the picture.

A New York

"It was Marxist managers not Yankee

oppressors who fired men for striking and brought strikebreakers to El
Teniente.

And it was a Marxist-led government that ordered police to use

tear gas and water cannon to break up a march on Santiago by 4,000 miners
1111
The masses, then, were treated to a scenario in which the bourgeoisie supported the demands of the working class, while the U.P. called
the workers' demands "fascist. 1112

This paradoxical situation caused great

confusion among the masses and Allende must be blamed for not involving
himself with the miners and exposing the role played by the Right in this
whole affair.

Because of his failure to do so the situation "resulted in

the Chilean proletariat suffering the most bitter episode of enemy penetration into its ranks. 1113
On the morning of June 29 an attempted military coup, which consisted of a tank attack on the Presidential palace and the Ministry of
Defense, was crushed by troops loyal to Allende.

The rebel troops con-

sisted of troops from the Second Armoured Regiment, led by Colonel
Roberto Souper.

In collaboration with the Patria-y-Libertad and the
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National Party and possibly with sectors of the P.D.C., they had hoped
to set off a series of uprisings throughout the cotmtry. 14

The small

number of troops who participated in the coup attempt showed that the
military was still not completely unified behind the idea of a military
confrontation with the Allende government.
However, at this point the most important effect of the attempted
coup was the working class' response to it.

Allende broadcast a call to

the workers to take over their factories and, if necessary, to come into
the streets to defend the government.
eration) reinforced this call.

The C.U.T. (Central Labor Confed-

C.U.T. was the main trade union organiza-

tion in Chile, however, less than 30 percent of the working class were
unionized.

Traditionally though, working class demands had been channeled

through C.U.T., and in 1969 it had been C.U.T. 's influence which had
mobilized the workers against Roberto Viaun's attempted coup d'etat in
October 1969. 15

However, the low amount of people actually unionized in

C.U.T. reflected the fact that there were many people who were excluded
from popular power.

Consequently, as the class struggle intensified,

the workers took it upon themselves to mobilize and organize their own
power bodies.

Although the C.U.T. was involved in the building of the

"cordones" the process was not under their control.

The workers, then,

had passed by_ the_ fohna:L trade cunioii organizatd'on;~ The C~ U.. L ·tried~ to
insist that all mobilization efforts should be coordinated by them, but
they were not successful in this.

If anything, the C.U.T. was a brake

on the revolutionary mobilizations of the workers by attempting to make
them subordinate to their more moderate guidelines.
The response of the working class was again impressive as it was
in October of 1972, and it increasingly sho-,,ed their militancy.

The
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"cordones" were quickly revitalized, and over 350 factories and several
hundred farms were taken over.

Trucks and buses were also requisitioned

in order that transport facilities would be ensured.

In addition, an

important aspect of the workers' mobilizations occurred:

"the strength-

ening and partial arming of their defense committees. 1116

Also, rumors

of further military conspiracies were rife and consequently new cordones
were forliled and long-term preparations were ma«e, such as the organization of medical and food supplies and firearms training.
The working class, then, had taken control of many sections of
industry and was more united and highly mobilized than ever before.

They

saw their actions as a defense of the gains made by the working class
against yet another assault from the Right.

A revolutionary situation,

then, was potentially in the making and even though this particular coup
attempt had failed, the workers " ... remained on the offensive awaiting a
revolutionary lead for the next stage in the struggle. 1117
However, Allende did not provide this lead; but by nis compromising
and seeming naivety concerning the class struggle, attempted immediately
to "stabilize" the situation.

The U.P. brought pressure to bear on C.U.T •.

to organize the return of the factories that had been taken over.

This

was not completely successful as many workers absolutely refused to turn
them over.

Allende then turned to the armed forces to ask them to

"restore law and order," and a decision was also made to recollect arms
that had been distributed to the workers.

Finally, Allende called for

compromise talks with the Christian Democrats.
These actions by Allende were another clear example of his
inherent reformism and lack of ability to take decisive actinn.

This

type of vacillation and inde-ci'si·veness has characterized many of Allende's
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actions, maybe because he never really had a definite strategy or master
plan.

Allende himself said, "The revolutionary struggle may be a guer-

illa campaign, a people's war, an insurrection, or a general election,
depending on its specific content. 11 18

However, at this point in time

there was no real choice left even if Allende could have made one.

The

polarization process had reached a stage where confrontation was becoming
inevitable.

The masses had already chosen the.path of a "people's war~"

but Allende was still dithering.

As the masses became more unified,

militant and ready for a move towards revolution, Allende moved nearer
and nearer to compromise solutions with the armed forces and the bourgeoisie.

The opportunity had again presented itself to Allende to uti-

lize the mass support he had, but again he failed to do so.

Not only

that but these attempts to give back the factories and recollect arms
was a demoralizing blow to the workers who had so instantly rallied forth
to his defense on June 29--many of them unarmed or carrying only sticks
and clubs.
Allende's refusal to give any real power to the workers left him
with only the military as a means to defend the government in the face
of the ongoing terrorist activities of the Right and the "gremios strike"
of July 26.

The truck owners announced an indefinite .strike and other

"gremios" (owners unions) came out on strike to support the truckers.
Commerce was halted for several days and industries were forced to
operate at below optimal capacity.

The opposition failed to close the

industries completely because the workers, as they had done in the previous bosses strike, activated the cordones and comunal commands to preserve some level of production and distribution.
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Allende's response was again reformist and of a compromise nature;
he reopened talks with the Christian D1::>mocrats, again shunning the mobilizations organized by the workers.

The P.D.C. insisted on the re-entry

of the military into the cabinet and on August 10 Allende complied, and
heads of the military assumed important cabinet posts. 19
The theme I have been trying to illustrate and analyze, then, is
one of continued reliance on the military in r~sponse to an intensified
Rightist offensive, even though the workers increasingly demonstrated
their power and readiness to support the government {llld move towards a
revolutionary situation.

Allende was mistaken in his policy towards the

armed forces and he eventually placed himself in a position from which
they were able to overthrow him.

As Sandri pointed out, "The fact was

that the positioning of the forces in the arena of the class struggle had
cut down his room to maneuver. 1120
The armed forces had a "tradition" of respecting the constitution
and being the guardians of the legal government; a tradition which Allende
continually attempted to maintain.

However, history does not completely

vindicate this tradition, as Alain Joxe pointed out, "Historically they
(the armed forces) have always intervened at political conjunctures that
were critical for capitalism and imperialism as they did in 1891 to bring
an end to President Balmaceda's brief attempt at economic nationalism and
almost continuously during the prolonged period of crisis from 1920-33. 1121
It was not so much that Allende was completely naive concerning the historical role of the armed forces.
energy attempting to appease them.

Obviously not, as he spent a lot of
However, he was naive in seeing the

military as neutral territory which could be won over by the working class.
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The military as a whole should have been viewed as an inherent part of
the bourgeois .state structure and as an active participant in that structure when it felt that the status quo was being overly threatened.

This

is not to say that propaganda techniques, as utilized by parts of the
Left, to S.Plit the armed forces was an incorrect policy.

On the contrary,

such a policy, as partially attempted by the MIR, was the only realistic
one.

By succeeding in causing the disaffectio~ of parts of the rank and

file, the strength of the military itself could have been weakened, and
a more effective popular militia could have been formed.

However, the

MIR did not have the ability to carry out such a policy in any concentrated way.

The U.P. refrained from doing so, because of a fear of pro-

voking a military backlash, and hence their policy revolved around appealing to the armed forces "constitutionalist" nature.
As I mentioned previously, Allende's attempts to keep the military
/

neutral or win them over to his side and his failure to respond to the
masses leftward movements, resulted in a situation where the military
became more and more involved in the class struggle.

During the time of

the U.P. government, the armed forces were called in by the U.P. on a
number of occasions to act as arbiters in the ensuing class struggle.
However, as the military became more and more solidified behind the
Rightist point of view, their actions as arbiters became increasingly
repressive against the Left.

After periodically being invited by the

U.P. to play the role of arbiter, it was not surprising that the military
themselves were to take it upon themselves to play the role of final
arbiter.
Allende first called upon the military on the occasion of the
"March of the Empty Pots" in December 1971. 22

This was a march organized
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by the Right in an attempt to spark off confrontation and elicit a reactionary response from the armed forces.

However, when violence did

break out between members of the Partia-y-Libertad party (who formed a
"guard of honor" for the march), and construction workers, the armed
forces moved in to support the workers and hence Allende.

Many wealthy

young men were arrested and a State of Emergency was declared in Santiago
in which soldiers enforced a curfew in the city's wealthiest suburbs.
March 1972 the armed forces again moved to support the government.

In

They

raided the headquarters of the Fatherland and Freedom group and requisitioned a large cache of arms which were reportedly going to be used in
a forthcoming "March for Freedom," organized by the opposition. 23
Incidents such as these in the earlier days of the U.P. government tended to reinforce Allende's view that the armed forces would remain
h s1. d e o f t h e work"1ng c 1 ass. 24
neutra 1 or may b e even b e won over tote

In

an attempt to do just that Allende consistently praised the military and
ensured that officers' salaries and supplies were not unduly eroded by
inflation.

It was almost an attempt to isolate the armed forces from the

class struggle, however, it was an attempt that became increasingly unsuccessful.
It is not my purpose to list a chronology of military events
which were aimed at repressing the Left.

This would be far to simplistic

a route as it would also be possible to list a number of events which
could be interpreted as being supportive of Allende.

However, I will try

to point out and analyze a few situations which illustrate the danger
involved in the reliance that Allende had on the military.
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Another "March for Freedom" was called for by the Right, this
time in Concepcion, and again it seemed with the intention of causing
large-scale violence.

A counter-march was organized by the Left, but

permission to hold it was refused.

However, in actual fact, both marches

took place and the police were brouiht in to prevent a clash.

The tactic

employed by the police to prevent a clash was to attack the Left-wing
March.

One person was killed and forty injured. 25

•

The police also frequently harrassed poblaciones.

For example,

in Lo Hermida a man was killed and many wer,e injured and arrested when
the police came looking for an "ultra-leftist who was being hidden in
the poblacion.
The fact that the June 29 attempted coup was only supported by
a few sections of the military showed that complete polarization had not
yet taken place.

However, without doubt "a change in the attitude of the

armed forces was becoming steadily more obvious."

26

This was again shown

by the military's !?terpretation of the new law which gave them power to
search for illegally ·held arms.

They used it almost exclusively against

the workers while ignoring the paramilitary forces of the Right.
Slowly, then, the military moved away from Allende's control and
became polarized to the Right.

The military, in spite of Allende's

efforts to the contrary, began to be effected by inflation and black market prices.

In addition they saw themselves as part of the middle class

whose position in society was being threatened.by Allende.

The revolu-

tionary Left's analysis of the armed forces had proved to be more accurate
than Allende's.

They (the armed forces) were acting out the role expected

of them in the State structure, namely, the protection of the domination
of the ruling class when it became threatened.
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The truck owners strike was still continuing and it was clear
that its aim was to bring down the government.

The military, though,

were clearly unwilling to move against the truck owners.

The new

Minister of Transport, General Ruiz Danyau, advocated that the government give in to them, and he refused to take any further action against
them.

Obviously Allende had to respond to this and he forced Danyau to

resign from the Cabinet and the air force.
of discontent among the armed forces.

Th:is caused loud rumbling$"

Allende felt threatened enough by

this to fire Faivovich, who was Undersecretary of Transport, and who had
advocated that the workers take over the owners' trucks. 27

Even at this

advanced stage of the polarization process, Allende was still making
desperate efforts to ward off the inevitable clash.

Efforts which were

a totally inadequate response to the Right's overtly confrontationist
maneuvers.

Allende should have realized that the bourgeoisie could no

longer be stalled with compromises and cabinet reshuffles.
Shortly after this General Prats resigned in order, as he put it,
"to preserve the unity of the armed forces," and Admiral Montero did likewise.28

The military, then, were closing their ranks against the U.P.

government.

The military coup of September 11, 1973 must be seen in the

context of the right-wing offensive which had been growing in intensity
in the preceding months.

The military, by purging "constitutionalist"

soldiers, t'error'izing the workers, and withdrawing their support from
Allende, were testing the strength of the opposition, while at the same
time cautiously moving into a position to stage a coup.

However, Allende

accepted all this "in the name of compromise, security and reconciliation. 112 9
Allende had a preoccupation with constitutional strategy, legality and
reformism.

This prevented him from seeing that by his reliance on the
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military and by his attempts to compromise with them, he was, in fact,
strengthening the very force which was to overthrow him.

The Right was

no longer interested in compromise solutions; the polarization process
had reached its zenith, and consequently, on September 11, 1973, the
Presidential palace was attacked and Allende killed.

The military junta,

headed by General Pinochet, which was formed just prior to the coup,
moved swiftly to take over lines of communication..;,industries::and attatk'',
and crush the workers. 30

Owing to Allende's refusal to mobilize and arm

the workers, most of them were unarmed and easily crushed by the military.
However, some industries had been able to obtain some weapons, but they
were eventually defeated by the superior organization and firepower of
the armed forces.
Throughout the last six months of the U.P. government the Right
had been moving closer and closer to a coup d'etat position.

They were

in the process of mobilizing and organizing the final confrontation.

Yet

Allende did not respond in kind, even thocgh the workers clearly showed
they were ready to move towards a revolutionary situation.

It seemed as

though the more intense became the Rightist offensive--the more desperate
became Allende's attempts at compromise.

By doing so he ignored his only

base of support, the workers, and in addition, increasingly left them
open to right-wing terro1·ism.

By failing to mobilize and arm the workers,

Allende became reliant on the armed forces for support politically, and
on the streets.

As a result of this the RightJ as a whole, was able to

strengthen its position while the working class became more isolated from
Allende and increasingly vulnerable.
Given the above balance of forces, the military were able to take
over and crush the workers, and Allende's heroic stand in the Presidential
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palace could not change the fact that his analysis of the class struggle
had been tragically mistaken.
As Monthly Review Press pointed out, " ••. the time had come for a
definitive answer and it came from the Right. 1131
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CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN CHILE

Hypothesis:

The U.S. was directly and indirectly involved in the build-

up to the coup in Chile, and although it was ~ot solely responsible for
the overthrow, its role must in no way be underestimated.
With the 1970 election victory of Allende, "U.S. policy-makers
and CIA and private corporate officials were thrown into disarray ..• " 1
Although ITT officials had kept a close watch on the build-up to the 1970
election, their concern over a possible Allende victory had not been
listened to very closely in Washington. 2

This was partly due to the fact

that the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, had confidently predicted
a victory for Jorge Alessandri, the right-wing candidate. 3

So confident

had he and others been that no coordinated machinery __had-_ been ;built; to deal
with the situation that faced them in September 1970.

Initially, then, in

the period between Allende's election victory and November, frantic, confused, and for the most part, uncoordinated efforts were made to block
Allende's confirmation.

Because of the confusion and lack of coordination

it was difficult to determine who was actually initiating U.S. policy at
this time.

The ITT memo's for this period, though, provide a useful insight

into U.S. machinations against Allende.
As I mentioned earlier ITT had been concerned about the possibility
of Allende winning the election, and when this became a reality, they met
with the CIA again and tried to impress upon them the need to form a plan
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of action to prevent Allende from being confirmed as President.

ITT also

tried to inform Kissinger that they were willing to financially contribute
towards such a plan.

This was revealed in an ITT memo in which William

Merriam, executive representative for ITT, informed Jack Neal, international relations director, "I telephoned Mr. Kissinger's office and
talked with Pete Vaky, who is the State Department's Latin American adviser
to Kissinger ...• I told Mr. Vaky to tell Mr. K:iJ,singer ... that we are prepared to assist financially in sums up to seven figures. 114

It was also

claimed that the State Department gave Ambassador Korry "maximum authority
to do all possible--short of a Dominican Republic-type action--to keep
Allende from taking power." 5
Without doubt the reaction of the White House to Allende's victory
was one of shock and hostility and "the most significant challenge to U.S.
policy since the Cuban Revolution. 116

The U.S. government's interdepart-

mental "Committee of Forty" met soon after the election to discuss the
implications of the Chilean results and to plan countermoves.

Although

it is not known if anything was decided at that meeting, " .•. there were
hints that the United States' line toward Chile was hardening and that
some form of intervention was being considered. 117

This was partly

reflected in an off-the-record briefing given on September 16, 1970 by
Henry Kissinger.

He saw Allende as " ... backed by Communists and probably

a Communist himself ••. " who represented, "a non-democratic party, which
tends to make his election pretty irreversible."
the situation as an extremely serious one.

Kissinger also viewed

" ... I don't think we should

delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present
massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S.
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forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere .•..
So we are taking a close look at the situation ...• It is one of those
situations which is not too happy for American interests. 118
views were more bluntly revealed in the New York Times.

Kissinger's

They quoted him

as saying. "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go
communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

9

On September 29 the head of the Cland~stine Services, Western
Hemisphere Division of the CIA, William Broe, met ITT Vice President
Edward Gerrity.

The content of their meeting came to light in the testi-

mony of Broe before the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.
There was a fear on the part of the U.S. that, " ... the Christian Democrat
Members of Congress were showing indications of swinging their full support to Allende in the belief that they could make a political bargain
with him ••• "

However, they were not totally certain of their move to

support Allende and hence ensure his confinnation as President because,
"At the same time the economic situation had worsened because of the
reaction to the Allende election and there were indications that this
was worrying the Christian Democratic Congressmen."

As Broe then further

explained, "There was a thesis that additional deterioration in the economic situation could influence a numbet of Chtistian Demooratic. Con-,
.

gressmen who were planning to vote for Allende."

10

Without doubt there was economic chaos in the weeks following
Allende's election.
goods.

Bank deposits dropped sharply as did the sale of

The inflow of capital from abroad stopped in September and the

Santiago Stock Exchange suffered a trading decrease of 60 percent.

Not

only this but on October 22 the Commander-in-Chief of the Anny, General
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Rene Schneider was assassinated during a kidnap attempt on him by an
extreme Right-wing group.

11

..These attempts to cause. panic and economic

sabotage failed however and Allende accepted a statute of guarantees and
hence ensured his official confirmation as President, by the Congress.
These early, frantic attempts though failed, and now as far as
the U.S. was concerned.

.!IA more· coordinated long-range.· strategy ·for

defeating Allende was needed.nl 2

Petras and .. LaPorte sum up the stance

•

and attitudes held by the respective U.S. actors in the months prior to
Allende's confirmation.

"Nixon's position and the.measures, speeches

and behavior of the lame-duck Frei administration were intended to create
economic collapse over a protracted period of time--while the CIA and ITT
seemed to see it as their immediate goal.

The political assessment in

Washington of the relationship of forces in Chile appears to have been
more realistic than the CIA's.

The prudent course chosen,--1.cimited···

to economLc pressure--was based on a long-term strategy of political and
13
economic attrition."
From November 1970 onwards those U.S. companies who had interests
in Chile and were opposed to the U.P. government, met regularly to discuss
their strategy against Allende.

President Nixon also realized the need to

coordinate and centralize U.S. foreign policy towards Chile, and conse-.
quently he made the Nationa] Security Council headed by Henry Kissinger,
his main foreign policy body.

The aforementioned U.S. companies kept in

touch with, and coordinated their efforts with, the National Security
Council.

A consensus emerged, then, between Kissinger, CIA, and ITT,

" ... by common consent the strategy consisted of maximizing external economic pressures on the vunerable points of the Chilean economy creating
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political conditions for a coup within a time span longer than that originally envisioned by the early opponents of Allende."

14

Without doubt, then, the U.S. had connnited itself to large-scale
intervention in Chile by means of clandestine interference, and diplomatic

• pressures.
and economic

This strategy of destabilization gathered momentum

after Allende nationalized the U.S. copper companies with virtually no
compensation.

ITT also reinforced its efforts after Allende appointed an

interventor to manage ITT in Chile.

15

•

The subsequent actions of the U.S.

became known as the "invisible blockade"; a strategy in which the U.S.
refused credit and aid to the dependent Chilean economy and encouraged
other private financial institutions to do the same in an attempt to cause
economic chaos.

This invisible blockade formed part of the U.S. govern-

ment's destabilization policy towards Chile.

The other part consisted of

"assistance and encouragement to Chilean internal opposition to Popular
16
Unity in order to create a mass basis for a military intervention."
The basic components of this invisible blockade will be outlined
here, however, it is the analysis of the effe'ct of the blockade which is
of the most importance.
In dealing with the period between Allende's inauguration in
November 1970 to early 1972, Sigmund maintained that the actions of the
U.S. government, private banks and multi-lateral lending agencies, needed
to be analyzed in the context of "motives".

A distinction was needed

between "legitimate reasons for not making loans and credits available
(serious doubts about Chile's likelihood or capacity for repayment) and
illegitimate ones (economic warfare in defense of private corporations
or in order to promote a military coup). 1117

Sigmund supported his "lack

of cred~t-worthiness argument with the assertion that the Chilean economy
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was in trouble by the end of 1971.

Copper prices were down, food imports

were rising rapidly and investment, especially in the private sector had
dropped sharply.

However, as Elizabeth Farnsworth pointed out, this was

not a satisfactory explanation of why the U.S. refused new loans and
credit to Chile.

In order to determine the real motives, the situation

must be looked at in a historical perspective, and political considerations must be taken into account. 18
The point that needs to be made clear is that Chile has always
been a dependent economy and hence has never been particularly credit
worthy.

In the past U.S. government and U.S. private sources have had

little hesitation in propping up the Chilean economy during the years
that Alessandri was President (1958-64).

Eleven billion dollars of aid

was also pumped into Chile during Frei's administration (1964-70). 19

In

total in the post-war years (until 1971), Chile received $540 million in
"development" loans from the Agency for International Development and its
predecessors.

These loans flowed into Chile largely to bolster the econ-

omy and prevent the election of Allende in 1964 and then to facilitate
Frei's "Revolution in Liberty. 1120

In a 1966 Senate study of foreign aid,

Senator Ernest Gruening described the U.S. rationale behind this.

"In

Chile, A.I.D. continued budget support and balance of payments assistance
during the 1964 election year, to prevent economic deterioration -which·:-.
would have sparked unemployment and discontent and presumably a swing to
the far left politically. 1121
When the actions of th•= U.S. government, private banks, and multilateral lending agencies concerning foreign aid are placed in a historical
context, then the political nature of their maneuvers becomes all too
clear.

Whereas in 1964 the U.S. attempted to support the economy for their
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political ends, the scenario described by Senator Gruening became completely reversed between 1970-1973.

Credit support was withdrawn to try

and cause economic deterioration, discontent with Allende and a swing to
the right.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank was one of the first to take a hardline stance towards Chile in early 1971 when it denied the Allende administration's first request for a loan, $21 millibn, to purchase three Boeing
passenger jets. 22

At the time of the request U.S. officials admitted that

Chile's "credit-worthiness" was the simplest part of the problem.

23

This

implied that the denial of the loan was political, a fact which was made
all the more clearer by the fact that " ... at the same time ... the Export·Import Bank ... was loaning liberally to such economically unstable countries as Haiti and Bangladesh. 1124
Then in August 1971 the Export-Import Bank announced that Chile
could expect no more loans or guarantees.

The State Department indicated

that this decision was "made on the White House level."

25

The Nixon admini-

stration, then, was intent on erecting a credit blockade, arid pressure was
successfully exerted on the multi-lateral banks toward the attainment of
this goal.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank

were instructed to "reject all requests for loans to countries that expro-

.

priate North American holdings without compensation."

26

Also AID "immedi-

ately cut off all U.S. aid tq Chile from the moment of Allende's victory,
and even went so far as to refuse to disburse loans signed with the previous Chilean government."

27

In addition to the invisible blockade enacted by the U.S. government, multi-national corporations with interests in Chile, also implemented
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plans to disrupt the Chilean economy.

On September 28, 1971, Merriam, in

an ITT memo, put forward an 18-point plan of action to overthrow Allende. 28
He proposed this plan to the White Hous1~ with the recommendation "that
everything should be done quietly but effectively to see that Allende does
not get through the crucial next six months. 1129

As revealed by earlier

memos, ITT was heavily involved in scheming against Allende and the U.P.
government.

However, there is no evidence tha~ the ITT ind5vidually

attempted to implement Merriam's 18-point plan, though the events that
actually occurred bore a striking resemblance to the plan.

Credit and

loans were restricted; there was a dollar shortage in Chile; the CIA was
involved; right-wing sources were funded.

This is not to suggest that

ITT initiated American foreign policy at this time, though its suggestions were obviously listened to.
ITT's actual involvement from late 1971 onwards was unclear
because of the lack of memos, however, Anaconda and Kennecott maneuvered
openly against the Allende government.

These two U.S. copper companies

were nationalized by Allende and they were determined to fight to get what
they felt was adequate compensation.

Kennecott attempted to disrupt Chil-

ean copper sales to Western European countries by legal means, by the
announcement that they (Kennecott) regarded the copper as their property.
Legal action on this basis was initiated in France, and had some success.
"Kennecott also successfully initiated a similar action in a German court
(Hamburg, on January 5, 1973)." 30
Paul Sigmund may have balked at calling these measures an "invisible blockade," however, I think without doubt the actions taken by the
U.S. government and private corporations, collectively constituted a consciously planned blockade.

An assessment of the effect of th·is blockade
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will not only reinforce the reality of its very existence, but will also
help to answer the question, "to what extent was the U.S. responsible for
the overthrow of Salvador Allende?"
An assessment of the situation must start with the early hardline policy of the Export-Import Bank, as this was to set the tone for
what was to follow.

Their refusal to give loans to Chile was an indicator

to private banks and countries around the worle that the U.S. had "blackballed" Chile.

The Export-Import Bank has great influence and its refusal

to grant loans, certainly encouraged others to follow their lead.
One of the most important points that needs to be stressed is that
Chile was a dependent economy dependent on the U.S., as a result of having
receivedlarge amounts of money,:for many years, from the Alliance for Progress.

Hence Chile needed dollars to import parts for U.S. machines and

vehicles, for fertilizers, medicines and food available only from the
United States. 31

The U.S. was well aware that the Chilean economy was

closely tied to them and consequently they (the U.S.) knew the harmful
effect their blockade would have. 32

Sigmund maintained that Chile was

able to acquire "alternative sources of loans and credit to Chile which
more than counter-balanced reductions from U.S. and U.S. influenced
sources. 1133

Admittedly Chile received credits from a variety of sources;

mainly other Latin American countries.

The most significant credits,

though, came from socialist countries; the USSR topped the list with $259

·11·1.on. 34

mi

However, they were mainly medium and long-term credits to be

used for importing capital or transport equipment.

What Chile needed was

short-term credit for consumer items and replacement parts for machines.
Because of the high level of dependency on the U.S., Chile needed short-
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term credit, and it needed it in dollars.

This was reflected in the fact

that only a fraction of the loans committed to the Allende government by
the socialist countries had ever been disbursed and utilized. 35

These

alternative sources of credit, then, in no way "counter-balanced" the
restrictive policies of the U.S., but in reality they did great damage to
the Chilean economy.

The credit cutback caused a halt in existing pro-

duction and expansion and facilitated unemployment and inflation •

•

Economic disruption by both the domestic opposition and the U.S.
had helped to cause problems in the state sector, which at this time was
exapnding under the auspices of the U.P. program.

However, as it expanded

huge deficits were incurred and as a result inflation increased rapidly.
Allende had also felt it necessary to increase the money supply by 100
percent.

In addition, the workers' wages were being eroded by inflation

and a black market had developed in certain food stuffs and textiles and
automobile parts.

The net result of this inflationary situation was that

the annual rate of inflation for 1972 rose to 40 percent.

By the time of

the final coup d'etat, inflation had risen to over 100 percent.
From this economic chaos, discontent and political polarization
quickly followed.

The U.S. also attempted to pressure Chile by making her

foreign debt renegotiations with the Paris Club, in April 1972, conditional
upon compensation being paid for the nationalized U.S. copper companies.
However, the other members of the Paris Club (who were mainly European),
bilaterally negotiated the rescheduling of the debt Chile owed them.

The

U.S. failed, then, to internationally isolate Chile, but nevertheless the
U.S. itself still refused to renegotiate and, as Kyle Steenland pointed
out at the time, this was of crucial importance as "Chile 1 s foreign reserves
are extremely low and its shortage of dollars is notorious. 1136

The Paris

80
Club renegotiations, then, cannot be used as an argument to lessen the
impact of the U.S.'s role.
The r,~sultant lack of foreign exchange should not be underestimated in its effect on the evolving situation in Chile during 1972.

The

scarcity of foreign exchange forced the Allende government to use what
was available to buy food and spare parts and cut back on consumer goods.
This caused discontent among the middle-class who were the main consumers
of U.S. style goods, and as the situation worsened and polarized, they
went over to the right-wing camp.
porters of a coup d'etat solution.

Evidently, they became active supAs Farnsworth pointed out, by the

above action, "U.S. policy facilitated the right-wing's organizing efforts. 1137
This, then, was the second facet of the "destabilization" policy,
the facilitating, financing and encouragement of right-wing organizational
strength which would create the basis for a military intervention.
took rather a simplistic view of this.

O'Brien

"When one looksa.at:.:the.::continuous

series of mass mobilizations of the Right in December 1971, March 1972,
October 1972, May-June 1973, and August 1973 (just to tally up the peaks
of frenzy reached by the opposition campaign) it would surely be giving
to much credit to the CIA's political and organizational ability to claim
that it or any U.S. agency was responsible for these movements •.. 1138
Few, I think, would question this analysis; the idea that the CIA could
have singlehandedly created such demonstrations was not feasible.

However,

O'Brien does not analyze the situation correctly or at least does not place
it in a relevant context.

The United States' invisible blockade had signi-

ficantly helped to create economic conditions which resulted in much middle
and upper-class discontent.

The polarization process had begun, and the
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stage was set.

Following on from this the role of the CIA was to "organ-

ize and politically direct that discontent. 1139
They did this partly by financing opposition activities and demonstrations, a prime example of this being the truck-owners' strike

" ... ev1.

denced by the large influx of dollars which ... stabilized for over a month
the price of the dollar on the black market. 1140

The Sunday Times (London)

also claimed that Chileans from the gremios ana unions were trained in
Amer.1.ca and returned to become "the cadres for the truck owners and other
Right-wing strikes. 1141

Money was also poured into El Mecurio,·an extremely

conservative newspaper, in order to foment right-wing ideas and activities.
The increasing number of unannounced U.S. officials operating in Chile at
this time, reflected this committment to organizing opposition activities.
The State Department officially listed only 89 functionaries in Chile,
however, there were other claims that there were over 1100. 42

Also the

"pots and pans" demonstration by middle-class housewives in Santiago
against Allende was strikingly similar to the 1963 "pots and pans

demon-

stration in Sao Paulo, Brazil, which preceded the junta coup against the
Goulart government."43

A coup which the U.S. had been successfully

involved in and was now seemingly trying to repeat its tactics.
However, the crucial group remained the armed forces, as there
could be no overthrow without their support and participation.

The U.S.

realized this and had always maintained close links with the Chilean
armed forces.

The stance of the U.S. was clearly revealed during the

"invisible blockade" in that military aid was exempt from it.
during the Allende years, U.S. military aid increased:

In fact,

in fiscal year

ending 1970 it was $800,000; by mid-1971 it had increased to $5.7 million;
and in 1971-72 it was $12.3 million. 44

The majority of the navy and air
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force officers eventually came round to the idea of bringing about a coup.
As the polarization deepened the military purged its ranks, and became
ready to act.

Without doubt, 11 U. S. military officials encouraged their

Chilean counterparts to act. 11 45
In the final assessment of the U.S. role, it must be noted that
considerable sums of money were spent assisting right-wing groups and the
military.

Advice and technical assistance were also given amply.

•

The

"invisible blockade" did exist and it did great damage to the Chilean
economy, and the polarization process was intensified by U.S. actions.
Some observers assessed the situation as being one in which 11 •••
The United States assisted in the making of the Chilean coup, but was not
the prime promoter of the coup. 1146

This has a certain amount of validity,

but it does not fully convey the impact that U.S. involvement had.

I

admit that there was by October 1972, the emergence of civilian and military groups determined to overthrow Allende.

This emergence and organiza-

tion was a response to the internal class struggle.

These two factors--

the internal class struggle and U.S. involvement--were so closely tied that
neither factor on its own can be labelled "prime promoter."

I don't see

the situation in Chile as having been the result of purely Chilean forces
or solely of machinations by the U.S. government and agencies.

However,

an assessment which pigeonholes U.S. involvement as "assisting in the
Chilean coup", relegates it to an unjustified secondary role.

The U.S.

was massively involved, directly and indirectly and the part they played
should in no way be underestimated.
The coup became, then, the combined efforts of the shared interests
of the U.S. and the Chilean bourgeoisie and their military allies. 47
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CHAPTER V
THE M.I.R. (MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT)
Hypothesis:

Although the M.I.R.'s activities caused the U.P. to move to

the left on certain occasions, it cannot be heid responsible for provoking
the Rightist offensive.
Prior to the 1970 election of Salvador Allende there were four
principal factions which made up the revolutionary left in Chile at that
time.

These consisted of:

(1) The left wing of the Socialist Party,

within which there existed a guerrilla wing.

However, it always remained

part of the main Socialist Party, and the U.P. coalition, although as the
polarization process intensified it often fo\llld itself advocating solutions which were clearly outside Allende's "constitutionalist" strategy.
(2) Maoism was represented in the revolutionary left by the Revolutionary
Communist Party (P.C.R.).

Although it was a small party it had had acer-

tain amount of influence among the students of Santiago.

However, its

demise was greatly enhanced by its call for a mass boycott of voting for
Allende in order to illustrate the uselessness of the electoral road to
socialism.

Allende's electoral victory, then, plus his avowed desire to

recognize Red China, syphoned off much of the P.C.R.'s internal and
external support.

(3) A collection of micro-groups, mostly Trotskyist,

who remained largely underground, and their activities were limited to
small-scale terrorism. 1

The,fourth and most important faction of the

revolutionary left was the M.I.R. (Movement of the Revolutionary Left).
This was formed in 1965 "from a variety of left-wing factions, notably
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Trotskyites and dissident socialists. 112

Though as Evans pointed out,

"The M.I.R. began as a Castroist current," with many of its ideas and
strategies originating directly from those employed by the Fidelists in
Cuba. 113

The M.I.R. was initially organized at the University of Concep-

cio.n from students and other leftist groups.

From these humble beginnings

the M.I.R. evolved to become the most powerful of the insurrectional organizations; the only one that made any significa.it inroads among students
and slum dwellers, and sustained its underground activities.

Groups which

it initiated and which came under its influence, comprised the Revolutionary Peasant Movement among Indians and migrant farm workers; the Front of
Revolutionary Workers in the factories, and the Movement of Revolutionary
Slum Dwellers in the "callampas" and campamentos. 114

In addition the M.I.R.

organized the University Movement of the Left for college students and the
Front of Revolutionary Students for high school students of twelve years
and up.

5

The M.I.R. was organizing sections of the masses, especially home. 6
less people, well before the election of Allende.
This organizing continued throughout the Presidential election campaign of 1970, and although
they did not openly support Allende, it seemed as though they did not actively oppose him, as they refrained from armed guerrilla actions during
this period.

The M.I.R. did not believe in the electoral road to socialism,

and this had been one of the main reasons why they had not attempted to
formally ally themselves with the U.P.

They often criticized the U.P.

for its insistence on following such a strategy.
impossible and armed struggle was inevitable.

Peaceful revolution was

"The seizing of power by

the workers," they wrote, "will be possible only through armed struggle."
The ruling class will not surrender its power without a struggle and revolutionary war is the inevitable result. 7
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The victory of Allende on September 4, 1970, not surprisingly,
threw the different factions of the revolutionary left into disarray.
Their philosophy of the non-viability of the "electoral road" had, at
this point, seemingly been repudiated.

The M.I.R. and the left-wing of

the Socialist Party were the only two groups of the "ultra-left" to
successfully weather this crisis.

As outlined above the M.I.R. gave

the U.P. critical support, but was always pessimistic about Allende's
chances of being elected or inaugurated.

When Allende became president,

the M.I.R. was faced with the problem of what course to follow.

As Evans

said, "Should it support the government or continue preparing for guerrilla
war?"

8

Initially it attempted to do both, though as the polarization pro-

cess intensified, it became increasingly critical of the reformist line
of the U.P., and in particular, the Communist Party.
Its activities within the government were mainly in the area of
intelligence and security, rather than policy making.

Allende used

MIRistas to form his personal guard (a move which was criticized by the
Right).

However, the M.I.R. was not part of the U.P. coalition and only

gave it tacit support and consequently most of their activities were
carried out outside the government apparatus.
The main role of the M.I.R. was to "dedicate themselves to the
mobilization of workers and students," because for them" ... the workers
have already gained the right to make the foreign enterprises, the banks,
the factories, and the land, the property of all the people."

9

The M.I.R.

seemed to have taken upon itself the role of the revolutionary conscience
of the U.P. in that it attempted to carry out actions which would "push
the U.P. from the left so that the U.P. would act on the most revolutionary
aspects of its program."lO
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This activity was most evident in the outbreak of land seizures,
most of which occurred between November 1970 and January 1971.

They

started on a massive scale in the Mapuche Indian regions of the south
where Mapuche peasants had traditionally claimed land from the latifundia
as theirs and had a history of land invasion.11 These Indians and also
non-Indian peasants were organized by the M.I.R. into the MCR (Revolutionary Peasant Movement), and this movement led many of the land seizures.
Cristobal Kay documented the dramatic rise in the number of land seizures
under the Popular Unity government, 11 .•. in 1967, 9 seizures; in 1968, 26
seizures; in 1969, 148 seizures; in 1970, 456 seizures; and in 1971,
1,278 seizures. 1112

Evans saw the situation as one in which "the timeli-

ness and effectiveness of the organizational and agitational work carried
out by the M.I.R. among the peasants have turned these actions into an
example that is spreading like an oil slick, from the south towards the
center and north of the country."

13

Allende saw that the movement of these armed peasant groups was
spreading across the countryside, and he was afraid that a response by the
landlords and the Right would provoke armed conflict.

For Allende, this

would be extremely bad timing as the U.P. government had not yet consolidated its political power.

Eventually, then, although Alle~de voiced his

understanding of the plight of the poor and hungry peasants, his adherence
to legality caused him to act.

14

On May 16, 1971, a confrontation occurred

between the police and landless peasants at a fundo in Santiago province.
Five peasants were arrested and the rest expelled.

15

Following this on

July 31, the government warned that it would no longer tolerate these land
seizures and Interior Minister, Undersecretary Daniel Vergara said, "The
full force of the law would be used to insure that private property was

90

respected. 16

The M.I.R. berated the government for compromising with the

opposition; however, they eventually agreed not to carry out any more land
seizures unless the landowner abused it or the government failed to redistribtite it.,
The inportant question that needs to be asked here is: "To what
extent did the M.I.R.'s activities push Allende to the left and consequently help to precipitate the Rightist backlash?"

Without doubt the

M.I.R.'s intention in organizing and mobilizing the peasants in the
countryside had been to try and force Allende to move to the left.

They

took over the lands and presented Allende with a "fait accompli," especially as they claimed that they were "only helping President Allende
carry out the agrarian reform and increase production for tpe country. 1117
To a certain extent the M.I.R. viewed their actions as supportive of
Allende in that they were ensuring that the Right could not subvert the
agrarian reform program.

However, their actions challenged the U.P.'s

hegemony over the mass movement, and it was in response to this that the
U.P. government took up the challenge and rapidly but legally expropriated
.

a large number of farms throughout Chile.

18

By this maneuver the U.P.

outflanked the M.I.R. and took away a lot of the credit due to the M.I.R.
for their organizational activities among the masses.

This is not to

suggest that every land seizure that took place was organized by the M.I.R.
On the contrary, many of them were spontaneous actions by repressed and
hungry peasants who act_ed once they realized that the armed forces would
not be used to suppress them.
The M.I.R. has been blamed for provoking the Right into action
and for causing the disaffection of the middle class to the right by their
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"ultra-leftist" activities.

A more accurate analysis of the situation

was one in which the right-wing press took advantage of the disagreements
on the left between the M.I.R. and parts of the U.P. and exploited them
to the full using vastly inaccurate headlines.

For example, in reference

to the land seizures, the conservative newspaper, "La Prensa," played on
the fears of the middle classes with stories of kidnapped landowners,
raped wives, drugged indians, and general rura.1 chaos. 19

Also, the

"illegal" takeovers of land, many of which were carried out without the
help of the M.I.R. "were immediately exaggerated and used by the bourgeoise to attack the government for its inability to keep the political
process within legal confines."

20

The bourgeois press was helped in its

efforts to exaggerate and exploit the role of the revolutionary left by
the Communist Party's hostility towards the M.I.R.

The C.P. saw the rural

and urban land seizures as undermining middle class support for the U.P.
and consequently, their anger over this was directed at the M.I.R.

At

one point relations between the two parties deteriorated to such an
extent that in December 1970, during an election campaign at the University of Concepcion, a gun battle broke out and an M.I.R. student was
killed. 21

Of course these kinds of confrontations were gleefully

accepted by the Right, and exaggerated to scare the middle class and
moderates away from a left-wing solution and towards the right.
Although the M.I.R. was most visible through its role in the land
seizures it was also involved in the organization of "campamentos."

The

U.P. also was involved in this area; however, its activities were limited
compared to those of the M. I. R., who viewed the movement "as a political
front of the class struggle. 1122

92
During the last year and a half of the U.P. government the polarization process intensified greatly and the mobilizations in the "campamentos" took a qualitative leap forward in the creation of organs of
"peoples power."

These became known as "comandos comunales" (Communal

Commands), and were created as a reaction to the "Bosses Strike" of
October 1972.

The MIRistas and militants of the Socialist Party were

in the vanguard of the "comandos comunales" in.which workers, housewives,
students, soldiers and the unemployed united together to take charge of
production, distribution and defense in their communities.

In the indus-

trial belts "cordones" were organized to lend solidarity to the workers
who took over the factories. 23
The working class's resistance to the strike caused it to eventually peter out, and unfortunately, the organs of "popular power" that had
been created fell, at least temporarily, into disuse.

However, the masses'

socialist consciousness had been raised to new levels, and it resisted the
return of the factories they had occupied and demanded the expropriation
of new ones.
The M.I.R. was involved in many other similar activities during the
period of Popular Unity; the "gremios" strike and the abortive coup of
June 1973, being the most important.

In these latter situations the M.I.R.

again agitated and organized among the masses in order to offer a resistance against the Rightist offensive, which by this time was almost ready
to deal its final blow.
So far in this, chapter, then, I have tried to outline the activities that the M.I.R. was involved in and analyze the extent of that involvement.

Without doubt they and the left wing of the Socialist Party were

invovled in urban and rural land seizures, and in the creation of organs
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of "peoples power."

However, a certain amount of this was spontaneous,

though admittedly some of this spontanity may have come from the momentum
created by the M.I.R.'s activities.

Also, in certain cases the M.I.R.'s

activities did cause Allende to move further to the left, and at a faster
pace than he had originally intended.

However, the theory that the M.I.R. 's

activities pushed Allende off his constitutional course and hence precipitated the Rightist offensive, accredits a far ~ore important revolutionary
role to the M.I.R. than in actual fact it had.
As the polarization process intensified so obviously did right-wing
pre~sure.·agatni;~;.tl\e _left, _and w;i,_thin .this context,_ t9e ma!;!ses_ on the left
c1sted to 9-~fend _t;heir c);a~s_ i~t~r.:est. - -Howev~r, the -masses _wh9 formeq the
"cordones" and "commandos comunales", and those who so swiftly rose up to
support Allende on the occasion of the abortive coup, were not members of
a mass revolutionary party led and organized by the M.I.R!
there such a party.

At no time was

In order to be able to accredit the M.I.R. with pre-

cipitating the Rightist offensive, the M.I.R. would have had to have been
the leader of such an aforementioned mass revolutionary party.
a position that the M.I.R. never held or acted out.

This was

In reality it had

done some organizing and mobilizing and this, plus its conflicts with the
rest of the left, was vastly exaggerated and exploited by the Right.

The

latter followed this course of action in order to give itself "justification" for its offensive and eventual coup against Allende.

This "theory

of provocation" cannot accurately be applied to the M.I.R. as its organization was too weak to be held responsible for mass actions.

As Roxborough,

O'Brien and Roddick pointed out, "if the theory of provocation is seriously
held, then it was the bulk of the working class and peasantry who were
provocative.

For it was they who took over factories and farms in response

94
to the right-wing threats of October 1972 and June 1973, and it was they
who demanded that Allende and his government take a firm hand against
the Right. 1124
The M.I.R.'s role, then, was overexaggerated by the Right; however,
this conclusion begs the other important question concerning the M.I.R.:
"Why did it fail to gain the leadership of the masses and present itself
as a viable revolutionary alternative to the U.P?"
The M.I.R. had had an organizational base and significant influence in the shantytowns and poor neighborhoods of Santiago, Concepcion
and other Chilean cities.

Also, it had had links with important sectors

of the peasantry and in the student movement.

Of all the diverse and

faction-ridden groups of the revolutionary left, the M.I.R. seemed to have
been the "key element in forming a revolutionary rallying point, if not
itself serving as the rallying point."

25

However, the M.I.R. was incapable of working out an overall,
rigorous, revolutionary strategy, and was guilty at times of changing its
orientations, and as a result, confusing the masses.

From the time of its

formation until Allende's election victory, the M.I.R. remained very much
a clandestine organization, carrying out bombings and robberies to fund
its activities.

26

When Allende came to power the M.I.R. moved towards a

more opportunist position, critically supporting the U.P. when it felt it
was necessary.

Admittedly, much of its critical support was intended to

protect Allende from the Right, but it also resulted in the M.I.R. failing
to present itself as a clear revolutionary alternative to the Allende
government.

Not only that but it also failed to make clear to the workers

how openly reformist the U.P.'s programs and policies were.

As I have

discussed in earlier chapters, Allende did not fundamentally alter the
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the capitalist structure of Chile, and in addition strongholds of the
bourgeois state, such as the armed forces, police, courts and constitution, were left intact.
Although the M.I.R. ~ay have been correct in trying to protect
the U.P. from the Right, it should at the same time have pointed out
clearly to the masses that they should have no confidence in the U.P.
Instead, they should have stressed more clearl~ than they did the need
for the masses to rely on their own mobilization and create their own
organs of power (especially a popular militia).

Groups on the left,

inside and outside the U.P. coalition, encouraged the masses to begin
to develop their own organs of popular control.

The local leadership

of various groups were involved in this; the left wing of the S.P.; MAPU
(United Popular Action Movement); I.C. (Christian Left); P.C.R. (Revolutionary Communist Party) and the M.I.R.

As Zimblast and Stallings

pointed out the problem here was, "The fact that this leadership was not
centralized, however, left the working class without a coherent strategy
for the conquest of state power."

27

The M.I.R., because of its weaknesses,

was unable to establish itself as the revolutionary leader.
Not only did the M.I.R. display general political weaknesses, but
it also followed incorrect policies which showed that it did not have a
true understanding of the nature of the class struggle.
They seemed to have had a confused policy towards the armed forces.
On the one hand they warned the masses against the reactionary nature of
the military and yet they entertained possibilities of "winning:the armed
0

.
.
.
tt28
f orces or 1 arge sectors o f t h e o ff icer
corps to supporting
t h e revo l ution.
Possibly this particular orientation in the M.I.R. camp was one of the
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reasons why they failed to split the rank-and-file away from the officer
corp to any significant extent.

Whatever the explanations, the M.I.R.,

being a Marxist party, should have realized that in the final analysis
of the class struggle, the vast majority of the officers would defend the
established system against the workers.
Another policy which the M.I.R. followed, which again seemed to
ignore their own Marxist philosophy, was thein lack of contacts and mobilizing efforts among the working class.

The M.I.R. did work among the

working class; however, they (the M.I.R.) did not accord it the primacy
which its position in the class struggle historically warranted.

For

man) years they worked with the peasants and slumdwellers; however, for
a mass party to be built and for the revolutionary struggle to be waged
successfully, the working class had to form its base.

In the mobilizing

and organizing that took place after the abortive coup of June 29, 1973,
the M. I. R argued strongly that the "comandos comunales" should be the
leading group of "peoples power," and the industrial cordones should be
subordinate to them. 29

This downgrading of the workers' role again

showed a misreading of the class struggle.
Also the M.I.R. was never able to conceive of building a mass
revolutionary party.

They relied heavily on an elitist type of guerrilla

warfare, which excluded mass involvement.

Consequently, many years went

by in which the reformist parties were able to capture ~nd strengthen
their hold over the working class.
The M.I.R., then, had many weaknesses which prevented it from
becoming "a revolutionary mobilizing center to the left of the Unidad
Popular."

30

However, it had enough visibility on the far left, for the

Right to exploit and exaggerate its activities and intra-left conflicts.
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Even with all the above points taken into consideration, however, the
M.I.R. still played an important role.

It may not have been a huge

force on the left, but it did do some very useful mobilizing and
organizing work and helped the masses raise their level of socialist
consciousness.
The mass movement in Chile largely acquired its own momentum from
the ongoing polarization process, but the M.I.R. played a significant
catalyst role.
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CHAPTER VI
CHILE:

Hypothesis:

TENTATIVE COMPARISONS WITH FRANCE AND ITALY

The "via Chilena" has important implications for European

leftists' attempts to come to powe.r, although .any comparisons and
speculations can only be of the most tentative nature at the present
time.
The Chilean Experience of 1970-73 has received much attention
throughout the world especially in France and Italy where left-wing
forces appear to be in a position of unprecedented strength.

The ques-

tion that needs to be asked is, how similar are the political situations
in France and Italy, and are they in any way comparable to those in
Chile between 1970-73?

If reasonable similarities can be identified

then some limited form of specualtion concerning future left-wing coalition governments in France and Italy would be useful.

However, even if

reasonable similarities cannot be found, then, this in itself would also
be a useful conclusion.
My first intention is to try and outline the political situation
in France and Italy in terms of the make-up, structure and strategies of
the differing political parties.

An attempt can then be made to form

comparisons with the Unidad Popular in Chile.
The Italian Communist Party under Enrico Berlinguer is at the
moment acting out its strategy of the "historic compromise."

1

In

essence this involves dialogue with and support for the Christian Democratic minority government.

The "historic compromise" was first voiced
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by Berlinguer in the fall of 1973.

He maintained that a Communist party's

strategy must be realistic and reflect the internal distribution of power
in the country.

Consequently, he saw that for the Italian Communist

Party (PCI), its best strategy was not to form a left-wing coalition with
the PSI (Italian Socialist Party), but with the center.

"Great changes

cannot be brought about by antagonizing powerful oppositions by splitting,
as it were, society into two hostile camps.

R~ther, such changes can be

accomplished only by forging alliances with a variety of different social
groups and with the mass parties which re;,resent them."

2

Berlinguer, as

this quote showed, had been following the events in Chile and was attempting to ensure that his party did not suffer the same fate as Allende's
coalition.

However, this "historic compromise" was not purely a reaction

to the events in Chile, but was also a blueprint for moving out of, and
staying out of, political isolation.

In 1962-63 the PSI joined a center-

left government with the Christian Democrats and consequently, the PCI
was isolated.

Therefore, in order to move out of this isolation it needed

to ally itself either with the Socialists or the Catholics. 3
During the 1970's the PCI enjoyed an upsurge in electoral support
as the regional elections in June 1975 clearly showed.
became the single largest party in Italy.

4

The PCI then

The reasons behind their gains

in popularity need not be delved into too deeply here; suffice it to say
that the worsening economic crisis and thirty ye;rs of corrupt, inefficient

.
5
DC
. . governmen t , persua dd
e t h e voters to 1 oo k f or new so 1 utions.
new solution seemed to be the PCI rather than the PSI.

This

The PSI had

suffered from a long coalition with the D.C., and had lost the confidence
of many of its voters. 6

The PSI's long-term hopes were pinned on a united-
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1975 Electoral Results in Percentages Compared to Previous Elections
Regional
1970*

National
1972

Regional
1975

PCI (Communists)
PSI (Socialists)
PdUp, DP, etc., (Revolutionary
Left)**
Total Left

27.9
10.4

28.9
9.8

33.4
12.0

3.2
41. 5

3.0
41.1

1. 9
47.3

D. C. (Christian Democrats)
PSDI (Social Democrats)
PRI (Republicans)
PLI (Liberals)
MSI (Fascists)

37.8
7.0
2.9
4.8
5.9

38.4
5.2
2.9
5.9
8. 1

35.3
5.5
3.2
2.5
6.3

*In recent years the administrative regions of Italy have
been goven increased economic, political and certain legislative powers.
**The 1970 figure is for PSIUP candidates. The 1972 figure is
for PSIUP Manifesto and MPL (left catholics). The 1975 figure is for
PdUp, DP (an electoral front of Pdu and Avanguardia Operaia), and a
few other revolutionary candidates.

7

left coalition, but the PCI did not favour this as they were afraid of
polarization and also they did not see the PSI as being capable of giving
them enough support to constitute a left-wing coalition government.
the only way was for the PCI to ally themselves with the D.C.

Hence

The Italian

Socialist Party withdrew their support from the D.C. and consequently precipitated a national election in June 1976.

The D.C. emerged with a

minority government and with the realization that it would be impossible
to govern Italy without the involvement of the PCI in some form or other.
A bargain was struck, then, and in return for sustaining the D.C. in
power, the PCI would receive explicit recognition of its increased importance in the House and Senate, several important chairmanships, and the
chairmanship of the House. 8
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In a number of ways, France has some similarities with Italy.
They both are traditionally Catholic and yet both have Communist organizations which enjoy widespread popular support.

However, due to the

strategies which were inherent in the left of each country, the political
situation on the left in France can be differentiated from that in Italy.
Whereas in Italy the Communists and the Socialists at different times
have allied themselves with the Catholics, the.French left has never felt
the need to do so.

The main Cabholic party in France, the MRP (Movement

Republicain Populaire) lost much of its support in 1947 when de Gaulle
broke his tacit alignment with them, and took over many of their conservative voters when he formed his own "Rassemblement du People Francais."

9

From then on the MRP lost votes in every subsequent election until 1967
when it officially disbanded.lo
In France at the present time, Catholicism as an influence on

politics, seems minimal.

There is no major Catholic political party, and

the increase in support for th•:: parties on the left shows that religion is
not an overriding consideration in terms of political affiliation.

Although

Catholicism is still the major religion of France, there seems little prospect of a strong Catholic party coming into being in the forseeable
future.
In Italy, however, the situation is rather more complex.
the MRP had been a party, mainly for leftists Catholics.

In France

However, the

Italian Chtistian Democratic Party (D.C.) is the party to which almost all
Catholics belong, regardless of class or political belief.

How important

is the "Catholic factor" in Italy at the pres.ent time, and how important
will it be in the future?
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Time magazine maintained that Enrico Berlinger is trying to come
to terms with the Roman Catholic Church.

They report that he recently

sent a conciliatory open letter to an Italian bishop in which he gave
"assurances that his party not only respects religion but sees it as a
possible stimulus toward building a true socialist party. 1111

These quotes

reflect the present strategy of the PCI in regards to Catholicism.

Not

only are the PCI at~empting to court the DC and the Catholic Church, but
also the huge mass of Catholic voters in the country.
Berlinger is aware that there is a growing trend of secularization
in Italy, and he is trying to re-fashion the image of the PCI so that it
can most successfully capitalize on this trend.

By lessening the PCI's

image of being hostile to religion, and by giving Catholicism a role to
play in the building of socialism, many traditionally Catholic voters can
be won over to the communist camp.
The table below illustrates the changing portion of the public who
view communism and Catholicism as compatible.

In addition to the statis-

tics shown in this table, recent electoral performances reflect this
diminishing influence of the Church in political matters.

The DC was

defeated in the 1974 Divorce Referendum, and the PCI gained substantial
support in both the 1975 regional elections and the 1976 national elections.12
If this secularization trend continues, and the signs are that it
will, it will be interesting to see how many traditionally Catholic voters
the PCI can woo away from the DC.

If it is successful at this, it may

replace the DC as the largest political party in Italy, and if this happens,
the DC may be forced to relinquish their tenuous control of the government.
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Figure 3: Trends in Religious Practice
and in the Perceived Compatibility
of Communism and Catholicism
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This aforementioned lack of a Catholic party in France meant that
the parties on the left in France, the PCF and the PSI, had to ally themselves with each other in their search for electoral victory.

Eventually

in 1972 the two parties formulated the Common Programme with the smaller
Left-Radical party. 14

Without doubt the progrannne was weighted in favour

of the Socialists as they were the stronger party, and this resulted in
tensions in the coalition as the PCF always envisaged themselves as the
"vanguard" of the Left.

Whatever the tensions between the three parties

of the Common Programme, they are all aware that their best chance to win
the national elections is to remain united.
them significant electoral success.

Their unity so far has brought

In 1974 the Presidential candidate of
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the Left, Francois Mitterand, came within a percentage point of defeating
Valery Gisgard d'Estaing in the race for the Presidency.
In the cantonal elections in the spring of 1976, the Left, for
the first time since the formation of the "Fifth Republic," gained an
absolute majority of the votes cast on the first ballot, 56.4 percent
(Socialists, 26.5 percent; Communists, 22.8 percent, and other parties
the remainder).

These levels of support have Qeen sustained in the parlia-

mentary by-elections of November 1976 and the municipal elections of March
1977.

If this trend is continued in the General Election of spring 1978,

then the Left is likely to obtain a parliamentary majority. 15
As in Italy this move to the left by the electorate was in part
prompted by the worsening economic conditions that the West as a whole was
experiencing.

In 1974 the French rate of GNP growth moved in negative

figures, the rate of inflation went over 15 percent, and unemployment
exceeded 500,000 for the first time since World War Ir. 16
In both Italy and France, then, in the 1970's Communist parties
have enjoyed an upsurge in support.

As I have indicated this has partly

happened as a reaction to socio-economic conditions and also dissatisfaction with the existing leadership.

However, it also reflects the fact

that both the French and Italian Communists have made great efforts to
publicize their acceptance of democracy and their distance from Moscow and
hence, hopefully, their acceptance by the electorate.

Can the "historic

compromise" situation in Italy and the "Union of the Left" in France be
compared in any useful way to the Unidad Popular coalition in Chile?
The Unidad Popular was also a coalition mainly involving the two
main working class parties, the Socialists and the Communists, as in
France.

The U.P. did contain some small center-left parties; however,
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the strategy of Allende in the earlier part of the government was not to
form a "historic compromise" of his own with the Chilean Christian Democrats.

The reason being that he did not need to, as he had won a plurality

of the vote.

17

Once he had accepted the "constitutional guarantees," he

was legally able to govern by the support of his own coalition.

However,

in the closing stages of the Allende government, overtures were made to
the Christian Democrats in an effort to halt t~e increasing political
polarization process. 18

A strategy which by then had no hope of working

as the class struggle had become too intense for a compromise solution to
be successful.
The similarity here is especially strong as regards Italy.
linguer saw the implications of the Chilean tragedy very clearly.

BerAllende

had won a plurality, not an absolute majority of the vote and consequently,
he was faced constantly by an opposition which had almost as much support
as he did.

An opposition which was not only entrenched in the governmental

institutions, but throughout the middle and upper classes of the entire
country.

As we know, the result was political polarization and the des-

truction of the Unidad Popular.
Berlingueris faced with a similar problem.

By a combination of

alliances on the Left and a future increase in electoral su~port, theoretically a Left coalition could come to power in Italy.

However, any increase

in support would still leave a large DC party and a staunch Catholic electorate behind it, in opposition.

For Berlinguer and the Communists this

scenario is frighteningly similar to Chile, and hence they have for the
time being decided to pursue their "historic compromise."
The failure of the "via Chilena" obviously caused much theorizing
among the Y-rench and Italian Connnunist parties concerning the prospects of
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a peaceful road to socialism.

The prospects for a peaceful way were sub-

jected to further scrutiny by the events in Indochina in the spring and
summer of 1975.

Here it seemed the opposite strategy, that of armed

struggle had succeeded.

In South Vietnam the sudden collapse of Thieu's

regime's military resistance quickly led to the Communist takeover in
Saigon on April 30.

As Tiersky pointed out, " ..• the Thieu regime had

been finally peaten down by military force rat.her than by political
machination," and this "served to amplify the signal of a power transfer
in Southeast Asia as a whole. 1119

The Italian Communists' assessment seems

to remain the same and the French CP's assessment also, at least publicly,
does not seem to have wavered from a commitment to the peaceful road.
However, in the aftermath of the Armed Forces Movement revolution of April
25, 1974 in Portugal, the PCF declared complete solidarity with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP).

The leader of whom, Alvaro Cunhal, had

declared that there would be "no parliament in Portugal. 1120

By such

actions the PCF strained the tensions inherent in the "union of the left"
and also brought into question its commitment to democratic procedures.
The basic tenets of the Common Programme are, by design, vague,
but as it is likely that the Socialists would be the controlling force in
a left-wing coalition government, the wording would be interpreted in their
more moderate fashion.

Both the Unidad Popular program and the Common

Programme call for certain basic social reforms, such as reorganizing the
economy more socialistically, income redistribution and institutional
reform. 21

However, given the above, that the French socialists are likely

to be administering the program, its impact would presumably not be as
great as that of Allende's program, and hence possibly not invoke such a
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violent response.

Neither program was or is a program that would destroy

capitalism, but Allende's was the more radical.
as a program to "lose on".

It was mainly intended

In other words, the reality of victory was not

seriously considered at the time the program was drawn up, and hence it
became more of a radical rallying call than a more moderate program to
"win on".

However, Allende won and came to power having promised to

carry out relatively radical reforms; reforms which evoked a rightist
offensive against him and his eventual downfall.

This election victory,

which reflected the increased support for the left, was partly a response
to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in Chile.

Large-scale poverty,

economic instability, inflation and the unfulfilled expectations generated
by Frei's "Revolution in Liberty" were the conditions Allende inherited. 22
Obviously, this socio-economic condition was far worse than those now
prevailing in France or Italy, and hence any rigid comparisons would be
of a precarious nature.

However, a trend of worsening socio-economic con-

ditions could and can be seen in all three countries.
Chile, France and Italy, then, all suffered a trend of worsening
socio-economic conditions and dissatisfaction with the existing administation.

Partly as a consequence of these factors, they all experienced an

upsurge of support for parties on the left.

Also they have had to deal

with strong Christian Democratic parties (especially in Chile and Italy),
and a large section of the electorate which is of the Catholic faith.
Given such a background, the Unidad Popular came to power.
chances of leftist

What are the

parties in France or Italy duplicating this feat, and

if either of them do, what form is it likely to take; and are they likely
to run into problems similar to those that Allende faced?
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At the present time the "Union of the Left" in France seems the
most likely candidate to "formally" come to power in the Spring Legislative elections in 1978.

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, their

support has been increasing in re~ent cantonal and municipal elections,
.
.
23
and the trend, if continued, should ensure the left a le 6 islative maJority.

In addition, the French President has not only been losing support to the
left, but he has also been under attack from tRe Gaulist Right. 24
Although this cannot be directly compared to the right-wing split in
Chile which allowed Allende to gain victory, dissension between the elements of the center-right in France may be important if and when the left
becomes elected and begins to carry out its program.

Presuming the "Union

of the Left" does win the spring elections, the spirit of the program is
most likely to be interpreted and implemented by the Socialists.

However,

the PCF will constantly try to push the Soc5alists into interpreting the
program more radically and at a faster pace.

In some ways this would be

similar to the role that the MIR played in Chile, although they were not
a part of the governing coalition and were more "ultra-left" than the PCF.
A

governing coalition of the left in France seems destined to be

riddled with tension and conflict.

The parties on the coalition may not

act in a very united fashion, as indicated by their present conflict (reSeptember-October 1977).

In addition it is quite possible that the Right

will react to a Communist-Socialist government with some degree of economic
sabotage, just as the Right did in Chile.

This could cause worsening socio-

economic conditions and political polarization.
down a path similar to that trod by the U.P.

This would seem to set it

However, the theory that the

situation could reach such a crisis point that the army would attempt a
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coup d'etat seems an extremely unlikely scenario for a country such as
France.

25
The situation at the moment (September-October 1977) is one in

which the PCF has recently made its latest attack upon the Connnon Progrannne
and has seemingly withdrawn its support from the "Union of the Left."

Some

of this conflict is over the number of ind,ustries to be nationalized and
in general over the reformist nature of the program. 26

However, the con-

flict is also over the PF's "ranking" in the coalition, and consequently,
this latest PCF maneuver may be an attempt to "jockey" for position within
the coalition in terms of trying to secure the best cabinet positions that
it possibly can.

However, it is also a distinct possibility that the PCF

will pull out of the Union of the Left for good.

It is still too far away

from the date of the elections to make any definite statements concerning
this at the moment.
Another similarity to Chile can be seen in the fact that a "Union
of the Left" government will not control all the governmental institutions,
just as Allende did not.

Allende controlled the presidency but not the

legislature. whereas in France, the Left would control the legislature but
not the presidency.

The French Presidential election is set for 1981 and

if things go badly for the Left in the early stages, there is no reason why
Giscard d'Estaing could not win re-election. 27

The possibility exists,

then, for a constitutional crisis to develop in France similar to the
actions of the opposition in Congress in Chile, blocking Allende's proposals.

Though, of course, in France, the institutional situation would

be reversed.
A number of different scenarios can be depicted and I have speculated on some of them.

However, as far as the future is concerned, the
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three more probable scenarios seem to be:
a) The "Union of the Left" will fail to unify for
the spring 1978 legislative elections, and hence
will fail to win the election or at the very least
seriously jeopardize their chances of electoral
success.
b) The "Union of the Left" will come to power, but
after a short period of time will be racked by
internal dissension and political and economic
pressure from the Right. As a result the coalition will collapse most probably by a withdrawal
of support by the PCF.
c) The "Union of the Left" will come to power and the
French Socialists will follow a moderate course and
act in the mold of a social democratic party like the
British Labour Party. The PCF will act as their leftwing conscience, but will be tempered by the responsibilities of office.
In Italy the situation does not indicate any great changes in the
future.

At the moment the PC! seems intent on continuing and consolidating

its alliance with the D.C. as part of their historic compromise strategy.
Berlinguer obviously sees the situation as being similar enough to the
events in Chile for him to shy away from a united left coalition with the
PSI against the Christian Democrats.

However, the Connnunists can be

expected to ask for payment for their political support in the shape of
cabinet seats and program reforms.

If it became clear that none of these

were to be forthcoming to the satisfaction of the PCI, it is quite possible
that at some time in the future they would withdraw their support.

The

probable outcome would be new elections and continued bargaining concerning
the possible make-up of a governing coalition.

However, the D.C. realizes

that the Communist Party commands almost as much support as they do, and
consequently, whatever governing combination is experimented with, it must
take full account of the position and strength of the PCI.
If the PC! cannot deliver some of its program reforms to its
followers.by the tactic of the "historic compromise, then they may begin
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to lose support.

There are three main parties of the revolutionary left

in Italy--the Avanguardia Operaia, the Hotta Continua, and the PdUp. 28
The tactics of the PC! could leave a vacuum on the left into which any or
all of these could move. 2 9
Certain aspects of the Chilean experience, then, can be seen
reflected in the politics of the left in France and in Italy.

These

similarities lead to some interesting speculat~ons for left-wing parties
in France and Italy.

However, the political situations in each of the

three countries in question are not so similar as to allow really rigid
comparisons or rigid extrapolations of events from one to another.

As I

have tried to illustrate, certain aspects can be co~pared, but these comparisons must be of a limited nature and the specualtions tentative.

Even

so, there is no doubt that the "via Chilena" has important implications
for left-wing parties in Europe, and without doubt had, and will have, an
effect upon their political behavior.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I have tried to analyze the intensifying political
polarization and the heightening of the class struggle until its culmination in the violent overthrow of Salvador Allende.

The focus has been on

the Unidad Popular government and their attempts to carry out their program while faced with growing opposition from the domestic Right and the
United States.

The key themes concerned the speed at which the U.P.

program should be implemented and Allende's policy of being overtly compromising with the opposition.
Ultimately, the matter comes back to a question of strategy.
Allende picked a strategy which turned out to be peaceful, reformist, and
often times slow.

It is this strategy and Allende's handling of it that

I have tried to criticize.

A peaceful road to socialism is not such an

unfeasible idea, if and only if, the proponents of this peaceful road
recognize and prepare for the inevitability of a violent confrontation at
some stage.

This may sound paradoxical but it can be distinguished from

a purely violent strategy of building socialism.

The latter strategy

preaches from the outset that participation in the system is meaningless
and that it must be overthrown by a workers' insurrection or some form of
coup.

Fidel Castro's takeover in Cuba was an example of this latter type.

However, the situation in Chile was differe~t.

A populist government had

been elected which contained two very strong working class parties.

To

the left of them was a small, vigorous, but mainly ineffective group (in
terms of revolutionary leadership) called the Movement of the Revolutionary
116
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Left (M.I.R.).

Given the relative strength and support for the existing

political parties in Chile in 1970, any advance towards socialism had to
be done under the auspices of the U.P.
One of Allende's biggest mistakes was that he did not mobilize
his supporters~ the workers, and prepare for the inevitability of violent
confrontation, even though the Right was consolidating its position and
openly challenging the U.P. government, both legally and illegally.
A whole history of class struggles throughout the world and specifically the events in Chile, bring me to the conclusion that a completely
peaceful road to socialism is impossible.

No ruling class has ever yet

given up their money, capital, and power without a fight, and I see no
prospect that they ever would.

However, in certain countries such as

Chile, and possibly in the future, France and Italy, the use of the electoral process and populist programs could be followed advantageously up
to a certain point.

Once this point is resched the benefits to be accrued

from working within the system are outweighed by the restraints of being
shackled by it.

As I have tried to show, Allende used the system advant-

ageously during his first six months, but he did not recognize the situation, post-April 1971, as being one from which he could advance more
radically and rapidly towards socialism.

Allende's own adherence to con-

stitutionality persisted even though his opponents were themselves clearly
operating outside of the constitution.

Probably Allende's last chances

to break away from the shackles the peaceful road was imposing on him
were in October 1972 and June 1973.
Strike" and the abortive coup d'etat.

These were, respectively, the "Bosses
The workers' response to these events

ll8

showed clearly that they were prepared to move into the violent confrontation "stage" of the peaceful road to socialism.
Allende did not provide the leadership they needed and the
ensuing desperate compromises he attempted could not prevent the Right
from overthrowing him.
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